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The Revival of Respondeat Superior and Evolution 
of Gatekeeper Liability 
RORY VAN LOO* 
In an era of servants and masters, respondeat superior emerged to 
hold the powerful accountable for the acts of those they control. That 
doctrine’s significance has only grown in an economy driven by large 
corporations that rely heavily on legions of subsidiaries and independent 
contractors, such as banks deploying independent call centers, oil 
companies using drilling contractors, and tech platforms connecting con-
sumers to app developers. It is widely believed that firms can avoid third- 
party liability for many laws by outsourcing or creating subsidiaries. 
This Article shows that common narratives of the demise of third-party 
liability are incomplete. Respondeat superior is alive and well. Moreover, 
in environmental, employment, consumer protection, discrimination, and 
other areas, the law requires large companies to act as gatekeepers by 
regulating third parties. These gatekeepers incur liability when they fail to 
enforce the law. In light of these features, the expansion of liability would 
be aptly described as respondeat gatekeeper. 
The task ahead is to understand and reinforce liability’s ongoing adap-
tation to a financially and digitally intermediated world. Updating 
courts’ analytic tools to include economics and network theory would 
more accurately measure power compared to the current, intuitive 
approach. Moreover, courts should view pervasive technologies of 
control—most importantly surveillance tools and online platforms—as 
stronger evidence of liability. The revival has the potential to restructure 
corporations, markets, and society in a beneficial manner by bringing 
harmful activities, as a matter of law, back within the fold of the firm.   
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INTRODUCTION 
Liability is a pillar of the law. It is “the means for enforcing contracts, civil 
rights, labor and employment law, environmental regulations, federal tax law, in-
tellectual property law, most kinds of property rights, and just about every other 
kind of law on the books.”1 Some view limited liability as “the corporation’s 
most precious characteristic”2 and an invention more important than “steam and 
electricity.”3 The desire to avoid liability determined the shape of the modern 
business organization.4 Moreover, understanding a firm’s liability boundaries has 
become more pressing because businesses increasingly rely on call centers, 
online third-party sellers, sales agents, brokers, ride-sharing contract drivers, debt 
collectors, delivery services, and many other external providers that may harm 
third parties.5 
Despite liability’s centrality to the legal system and industrial organization, an 
existential question for decades received limited attention: When is one company 
liable for the acts of a separate entity?6 The legal issue of when a business can be 
held liable for the acts of another business traces back to the common law doc-
trine of respondeat superior. The law as long recounted in scholarship, cases, and 
textbooks is that except in unusual circumstances, businesses are not liable for 
the acts of independent contractors.7 Additionally, as the Supreme Court has 
observed, “It is a general principle of corporate law deeply ‘ingrained in our 
1. Lynn M. LoPucki, The Death of Liability, 106 YALE L.J. 1, 4 (1996). 
2. William W. Cook, “Watered Stock”—Commissions—“Blue Sky Laws”—Stock Without Par 
Value, 19 MICH. L. REV. 583, 583 (1921) (quoting President Charles Eliot of Harvard University). 
3. William P. Hackney & Tracey G. Benson, Shareholder Liability for Inadequate Capital, 43 U. 
PITT. L. REV. 837, 841 (1982) (quoting President Nicholas Murray Butler of Columbia University). 
4. See, e.g., LoPucki, supra note 1, at 21 (“Limiting liability—that is, defeating part of it—is the 
principal reason for creating [multiple corporate] entities.”). 
5. See, e.g., Margaret M. Blair, Erin O’Hara O’Connor & Gregg Kirchhoefer, Outsourcing, 
Modularity, and the Theory of the Firm, 2011 BYU L. REV. 263, 272–90 (describing the hierarchy and 
production interdependence of corporations). 
6. Sustained attention on the topic has mostly focused on legal subareas without providing a big- 
picture perspective, or on economic issues of whether vicarious liability provides an optimal level of 
incentive to take precautions. For economic treatments, see, for example, Jennifer H. Arlen & W. 
Bentley MacLeod, Beyond Master–Servant: A Critique of Vicarious Liability, in EXPLORING TORT LAW 
111, 122–24 (M. Stuart Madden ed., 2005); Richard R. W. Brooks, Liability and Organizational Choice, 
45 J.L. & ECON. 91, 93–94 (2002); Alan O. Sykes, The Economics of Vicarious Liability, 93 YALE L.J. 
1231, 1233 (1984). For an example of third-party liability in a narrower organizational context, see 
Michael R. Flynn, The Law of Franchisor Vicarious Liability: A Critique, 1993 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 
89, 102 (arguing that it is inappropriate to apply vicarious liability to franchisor–franchisee 
relationships). 
7. See, e.g., Lewis A. Kornhauser, An Economic Analysis of the Choice Between Enterprise and 
Personal Liability for Accidents, 70 CALIF. L. REV. 1345, 1375 (1982) (“An enterprise is not liable for 
the torts of its independent contractors . . . .”); Gary T. Schwartz, The Hidden and Fundamental Issue of 
Employer Vicarious Liability, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 1739, 1753 (1996) (“[T]he negligence of the 
contractor is (absent special circumstances) not attributed to that party.”). 
2020] THE REVIVAL OF RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR 143 
economic and legal systems’ that a parent corporation . . . is not liable for the acts 
of its subsidiaries.”8 
The dominant corporate law narrative is thus that businesses can avoid liability 
by drawing organizational boundaries.9 For instance, as mounting liability 
loomed for the tobacco industry and asbestos manufacturers, “disaggregation 
came swiftly,” through corporate spinoffs and organizational walls, enabling 
companies to avoid taking responsibility for ending many lives.10 Businesses 
have also sought to avoid paying employment benefits by using independent con-
tractors.11 More recently, the legal literature has turned its attention to “intermedi-
ary liability” for content posted online by third parties12 and to Amazon’s ability 
to avoid product liability for defective items sold by third-party sellers.13 
Scholars in these conversations portray a legal architecture that provides “a broad 
grant of immunity from tort liability.”14 Those recent conversations in specific 
areas reinforce the longstanding notion that the law’s inability to keep pace with 
subsidiaries and outsourcing has put liability “at risk of death.”15 
This Article resumes those narratives where others left off—at liability’s low-
est point—by demonstrating how respondeat superior and its progeny are in the 
midst of a resurgence. It expands the intermediary liability conversation to recent 
8. United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51, 61 (1998); see also infra Part I. 
9. The most active and recent corporate law conversations about third-party liability have focused on 
holding parent companies liable for the acts of corporate subsidiaries, especially “piercing the corporate 
veil.” Scholars examining vicarious liability typically reach a similar conclusion as the Court—that 
considerable barriers exist to holding companies liable for the acts of subsidiaries. See, e.g., Phillip I. 
Blumberg, Accountability of Multinational Corporations: The Barriers Presented by Concepts of the 
Corporate Juridical Entity, 24 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 297, 303–04 (2001) (“Traditional 
entity law . . . creates a fundamental barrier to the imposition of liability . . . .”). The context-specific 
motivation could move firms toward liability or away from it, but all else being equal, they have 
incentives to outsource to contractors with limited assets. See, e.g., A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven 
Shavell, Punitive Damages: An Economic Analysis, 111 HARV. L. REV. 869, 944 & n.238 (1998). 
10. See LoPucki, supra note 1, at 65. 
11. See infra notes 188–89 and accompanying text. 
12. The law and technology literature has examined third-party liability mostly from the perspective 
of intellectual property and speech. See, e.g., H. Brian Holland, In Defense of Online Intermediary 
Immunity: Facilitating Communities of Modified Exceptionalism, 56 U. KAN. L. REV. 369 (2008); Kate 
Klonick, The New Governors: The People, Rules, and Processes Governing Online Speech, 131 HARV. 
L. REV. 1598, 1601–03 (2018); Olivier Sylvain, Intermediary Design Duties, 50 CONN. L. REV. 203, 269 
(2018). 
13. See Edward J. Janger & Aaron D. Twerski, The Heavy Hand of Amazon: A Seller Not a Neutral 
Platform, 14 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 259, 263 (2020). 
14. See, e.g., Holland, supra note 12, at 370 (describing how the Communications Decency Act “is 
now conceived as a broad grant of immunity from tort liability”). 
15. See LoPucki, supra note 1, at 7 (“[T]ort and statutorily imposed liability are at risk of death.”). 
Another common context for vicarious liability in the corporate law literature is in an internal sense of 
determining whether individual officers or shareholders may be held vicariously liable for the actions of 
the corporation or its employees. See, e.g., Nina A. Mendelson, A Control-Based Approach to 
Shareholder Liability for Corporate Torts, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1203, 1206–07 (2002) (exploring the 
possibility of holding shareholders vicariously liable for tort-like statutory violations). There, again, the 
answer is almost never. See Timothy P. Glynn, Beyond “Unlimiting” Shareholder Liability: Vicarious 
Tort Liability for Corporate Officers, 57 VAND. L. REV. 329, 338–43 (2004) (documenting the growth of 
statutory- and common law-liability protections for shareholders and officers). 
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areas of wrongdoing where the law has increasingly imposed restrictions on tech 
platforms. And for other large industries, it adds the next chapter after the pre-
dicted death of corporate liability. Not only do many legal rules now arguably 
“pierce the corporate veil” by holding the parent liable for the subsidiary’s acts,16 
but they also offer ways to reach outside the corporate structure to impose liabil-
ity for the harms of completely independent contractors.17 To provide a full 
account of corporate liability, it is essential to consider a broader set of laws and 
institutional arrangements than exists in the literature.18 
Changes in markets, technology, and governance have reenergized third-party 
liability. Although the doctrinal test for respondeat superior is muddled, two key 
factors are whether the principal could monitor and punish the third party.19 
Large companies’ pervasive utilization of big data and remote-surveillance tools 
better equips them to monitor independent contractors and other service pro-
viders.20 In terms of punishment, industries such as air travel and telecommunica-
tions are far more concentrated, often leaving consumers with few options.21 
Consequently, the remaining businesses can pose more of a threat by ceasing to 
do business with any wrongdoer, thereby cutting off vital access to substantial 
portions of a given market. Because businesses today have heightened capacity to 
monitor and punish their contractual counterparties, courts have stronger founda-
tions for seeing the relationships as principals controlling third-party agents.22 
Governance changes also drive some of the liability resurgence. As I have 
explained elsewhere, over the past few decades lawmakers and regulators have 
increasingly deputized sizeable firms as enforcers of public law—making them 
the new gatekeepers.23 Whereas the old gatekeepers were mostly accountants, 
lawyers, and other peripheral actors tasked with ensuring firms’ legal compli-
ance,24 the new gatekeepers are the world’s largest firms themselves. When the 
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) orders Facebook to monitor and punish app 
16. Whether respondeat superior should be described as piercing the veil in such instances or as 
providing an alternative has been subject to debate, though the answer to that debate does not alter this 
Article’s thesis. See Robert B. Thompson, Piercing the Corporate Veil: An Empirical Study, 76 
CORNELL L. REV. 1036, 1063 (1991) (finding forty-eight cases in which courts used agency law to pierce 
the corporate veil, or eight percent of all cases reviewed). But see Robert W. Hamilton, The Corporate 
Entity, 49 TEX. L. REV. 979, 983 (1971) (criticizing descriptions of agency law and tort law as piercing 
the corporate veil). 
17. See infra Part II. 
18. As scholars recognized decades ago, even in a world of unlimited veil piercing, companies could 
still strategically outsource harmful activities to independent contractors that are not subsidiaries. See, 
e.g., Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Toward Unlimited Shareholder Liability for Corporate 
Torts, 100 YALE L.J. 1879, 1915 (1991) (discussing the implications of downsizing and disaggregation). 
19. See infra Part II. 
20. See infra Section II.A.1. 
21. See TIM WU, THE CURSE OF BIGNESS: ANTITRUST IN THE NEW GILDED AGE 20–21 (2018). 
22. See infra Section II.A. 
23. See Rory Van Loo, The New Gatekeepers: Private Firms as Public Enforcers, 106 VA. L. REV. 
467, 470–71, 493–94 (2020). 
24. See Stavros Gadinis & Colby Mangels, Collaborative Gatekeepers, 73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 
797, 802 (2016); Reiner H. Kraakman, Gatekeepers: The Anatomy of a Third-Party Enforcement 
Strategy, 2 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 53, 54 & n.3 (1986) (defining gatekeepers as “third parties who can 
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developers, or the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) tells banks to 
develop policies to monitor call centers and debt collectors for consumer viola-
tions, authorities are conscripting firms to serve as quasi-regulators.25 
That emerging form of governance affects third-party liability both indirectly 
and directly. Indirectly, the requirement of policing third parties for misbehavior 
may set the company up to be perceived as being in a principal–agent 
relationship—and thus more likely to be held liable under the law.26 More 
directly, prosecutors and regulators increasingly do not need to establish agency 
because the law or informal authority can hold companies liable for the acts of 
third parties without an agency relationship by mandating nondelegable duties.27 
In some instances, this regulatory authority has moved toward breaching one of 
the most heavily reinforced barriers of corporate law—individual officers’ near 
immunity from liability—as exemplified by the FTC making Mark Zuckerberg 
civilly and criminally liable for future Facebook privacy missteps.28 What can be 
seen as an expansion of gatekeeper liability is extending the principles of respon-
deat superior. 
In short, this Article shows how liability is stretching to reintegrate many activ-
ities back into the large businesses that outsourced them. Without formally 
describing it as such, the law often treats those activities as performed by employ-
ees of the company, thereby organizationally situating harms where the law com-
fortably reaches.29 In other words, the doctrine is adapting to the profound 
restructuring and disintegration of enterprises by—as a matter of law—putting 
the pieces back together. 
The implications of that reintegration are far-reaching. Third-party liability has 
become more relevant in a modern economy characterized by heightened levels 
of outsourcing and specialization. Markets today are also financially and techno-
logically intermediated to an unprecedented extent.30 As a result, even outside of 
disrupt misconduct by withholding support”); Andrew F. Tuch, Multiple Gatekeepers, 96 VA. L. REV. 
1583, 1585 (2010) (explaining how these and other various actors act as a net of gatekeepers). 
25. See Van Loo, supra note 23, at 482, 485. 
26. See infra Section II.A. 
27. See infra Section II.B. 
28. See United States v. Facebook, Inc., No. 19-2184 (TJK), 2020 WL 1975785, at *5 (D.D.C. Apr. 
23, 2020); see also Van Loo, supra note 23, at 502–05 (discussing how authorities are pushing 
individuals toward personal liability). In this regard, some of the liability revival demonstrates Professor 
Mark Roe’s point that “Delaware’s chief competitive pressure comes not from other states but from the 
federal government.” Mark J. Roe, Delaware’s Competition, 117 HARV. L. REV. 588, 590 (2003). 
29. See infra Part II. 
30. See Kathryn Judge, Intermediary Influence, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 573, 575 (2015) (describing how 
changes “in information technology and financial innovations have radically changed how capital 
moves from investors to projects” and the growing influence of financial intermediaries); Tom C.W. 
Lin, Infinite Financial Intermediation, 50 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 643, 655 (2015) (“Instead of true 
disintermediation, where links in a financial process are eliminated, financial innovation has generally 
further strengthened intermediation through substitution and layering.”). But see Mark Fenwick & Erik 
P.M. Vermeulen, Technology and Corporate Governance: Blockchain, Crypto, and Artificial 
Intelligence, 48 TEX. J. BUS. L. 1, 4 (2019) (“The consensus is that [digital technologies] will drive a 
societal shift away from a ‘centralized world’ to more decentralized and disintermediated 
alternatives.”). 
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online platforms, producing a good or service now involves a more extensive net-
work of business entities than ever before. 
A third-party doctrine should ensure that firms internalize the full costs of their 
business activities, but to do so, it must adjust for the evolving nature of industrial 
organization. Despite meaningful advances, the revival has proceeded in a piece-
meal manner. Part of the problem is that a common law agency test with over ten 
factors31 can obscure what should be the focus: the firm’s ability to monitor and 
punish the third party. Moreover, traditional analyses of respondeat superior are 
outdated because they ignore even basic economic considerations like market 
share, company size, and network theory. Those omissions risk distorting the 
measurement of power. 
What is needed is the ability to impose liability on those best positioned to pre-
vent harms due to their influence over a given web of business relationships, fi-
nancial ties, and technological links. That concept is as much about network 
liability as it is either about gatekeeper liability or respondeat superior.32 If 
judges, legislators, and administrative agency leaders recognize that an expansive 
third-party liability is not only becoming commonplace but also consistent with 
the common law, they will have the doctrinal and normative foundations for 
meaningful legal updates that can improve efficiency and distribution. They can 
then more deliberately continue the centuries-old task of adapting the doctrine to 
ever shapeshifting forms of corporate control. 
Part I chronicles the decline and limitations of respondeat superior as docu-
mented in sources spanning from decades-old literature to recent Supreme Court 
cases. Part II recounts third-party liability’s rebirth due to policy and technologi-
cal changes. Those changes have both strengthened the common law’s ability to 
find agency under respondeat superior and created new classes of duties that large 
firms are prohibited from delegating even if a principal–agent relationship does 
not exist. Part III previews the societal implications of and normative foundations 
for the revival of third-party liability. This revival implicates organizational 
choices on whether to outsource, exert closer control over third parties, and build 
platforms. Ways to improve measuring power include examining market share, 
valuation, and network influence. 
Some clarification is in order before turning to the main discussion. 
Respondeat superior means different things to scholars in particular fields. Some 
have a more capacious interpretation, seeing it as synonymous with vicarious 
liability, whereas others see those concepts as separate.33 Additionally, for some 
31. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1958) (listing ten factors 
“among others”). 
32. See infra notes 314–17 and accompanying text (distinguishing gatekeeper liability). 
33. See, e.g., Arlen & MacLeod, supra note 6, at 112 (“Vicarious liability (or respondeat superior) 
holds organizations (and other principals) liable for their agents’ torts . . . .”). However, vicarious 
liability is sometimes used as a broader concept that incorporates or grew out of respondeat superior. 
See, e.g., Alfred C. Yen, Internet Service Provider Liability for Subscriber Copyright Infringement, 
Enterprise Liability, and the First Amendment, 88 GEO. L.J. 1833, 1843 (2000) (“Vicarious liability in 
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parts of the liability revival, a better analogy than respondeat superior lies else-
where, such as in negligent supervision or the failure to supervise. 
Due to the breadth of this project, space constraints do not allow for distin-
guishing these and other terminology nuances and field-specific liability regimes. 
Viewed as its Latin translation of “let the superior make answer,”34 respondeat 
superior might be seen as an appropriate name for all of the expansion discussed 
below. Nonetheless, to lessen potential terminology confusions across fields, 
respondeat superior is mostly used here in its narrower sense. The revival of 
respondeat superior thus more precisely refers to the extension of the common 
law respondeat superior’s potential to reach a greater number of entities. The 
broader expansion includes a reincarnation of that doctrine in new forms, and 
thus for the sake of clarity merits a new name that reflects its two primary concep-
tual frameworks—respondeat gatekeeper.35 
I. THE DECLINE OF RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR 
Respondeat superior emerged long before the rise of the modern globalized 
economy. It originated as a means of holding the head of a household responsible 
for the acts of household members—in particular, servants and slaves.36 Over 
time, however, the common law has changed regarding who must answer for 
what acts. The most consistent theme in this messy and evolving doctrine is a 
goal still relevant to today’s commercial landscape, dominated as it is by frag-
mented actors and large corporations: to impose liability on those with the power 
to control others.37 
A. THE COMMON LAW RISE AND FALL 
As commercial channels stretched and spread in the late seventeenth and early 
eighteenth centuries, judges began to apply respondeat superior to remote busi-
ness relationships, including that between shipowner and crew.38 Courts also 
moved from holding parties liable only for specifically commanded acts to 
imposing liability for a broader set of acts committed in the course of business.39 
The guiding principle in this expansion was the idea that “[b]ecause employers 
copyright differs from the tort doctrine of respondeat superior because it extends vicarious liability 
beyond the employer/employee or master/servant relationship.”). 
34. Respondeat Superior, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). 
35. An alternative would be “respondeat imperium,” reflecting the Latin word for “power.” 
36. John H. Wigmore, Responsibility for Tortious Acts: Its History, 7 HARV. L. REV. 315, 317–18 
(1894). 
37. See, e.g., David Jacks Achtenberg, Taking History Seriously: Municipal Liability Under 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983 and the Debate over Respondeat Superior, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 2183, 2198–99 (2005) (explaining 
the roots in holding liable those with the power to control); Deanna N. Conn, When Contract Should 
Preempt Tort Remedies: Limits on Vicarious Liability for Acts of Independent Contractors, 15 FORDHAM J. 
CORP. & FIN. L. 179, 180 (2009). 
38. See, e.g., Boson v. Sandford (1689) 91 Eng. Rep. 382; 2 Salk. 440 (holding shipowner liable for 
freight spoiled by crew). See generally Wigmore, supra note 36 (providing a history of respondeat 
superior). 
39. See Francis Bowes Sayre, Criminal Responsibility for the Acts of Another, 43 HARV. L. REV. 689, 
693 (1930). 
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expected to profit from their employees’ work, it was fair for them to pay for their 
employees’ torts.”40 
In the nineteenth century, some courts applied respondeat superior even more 
liberally by holding liable whoever paid for the harmful activity—even if that 
party paid an independent contractor.41 When someone hired a carpenter or 
mechanic, for instance, a number of courts held that the payments meant the hir-
ing party was liable for harms the independent contractor committed to third par-
ties.42 By the twentieth century, however, courts had coalesced around common 
law agency as a necessary—albeit not sufficient—condition for holding a com-
pany liable for the act of a third party in many contexts.43 Agency remains a foun-
dation of vicarious liability today for a vast assortment of federal statutes and 
regulations.44 
When compared to their focus on the party paying, courts’ embrace of the 
agency test marked a setback for respondeat superior and in hindsight planted the 
seeds of the doctrine’s eventual downfall. The test to determine agency over a 
contractual party has many factors,45 causing scholars much consternation about 
the judicial variance in applying the doctrine.46 Above all, the agency test 
requires plaintiffs to establish that the hiring party controlled, or had the right to 
control, the particular act causing harm.47 Merely paying an independent contrac-
tor is insufficient to establish respondeat superior absent control.48 
Despite making it difficult to establish claims for third-party liability,49 agency 
law did not prevent courts from holding businesses accountable for the acts of 
their employees.50 Respondeat superior thereby accommodated more far- 
reaching liability for long periods in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. 
40. Achtenberg, supra note 37, at 2202. 
41. See, e.g., Richard R. Carlson, Why the Law Still Can’t Tell an Employee When It Sees One and 
How It Ought to Stop Trying, 22 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 295, 304–05 (2001). 
42. See id. at 304 & n.41 (summarizing cases). 
43. See Sayre, supra note 39. There are other tests and many context-specific elements depending on 
the area of application, including the need to establish an employer–employee relationship (formerly 
master–servant). See RESTATEMENT OF EMP’T LAW § 1.01(a)(3) (AM. LAW INST. 2015) (listing as one of 
the conditions of employment that “the employer controls the manner and means by which the 
individual renders services, or the employer otherwise effectively prevents the individual from 
rendering those services as an independent businessperson”); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.07 
(2) (AM. LAW INST. 2006) (“An employee acts within the scope of employment when performing work 
assigned by the employer or engaging in a course of conduct subject to the employer’s control.”). 
44. See infra notes 104–09. 
45. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1958). 
46. See e.g., Conn, supra note 37, at 186–89; Michael C. Harper, Fashioning a General Common 
Law for Employment in an Age of Statutes, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 1281, 1295–96 (2015). 
47. See, e.g., Meyer v. Holley, 537 U.S. 280, 286 (2003) (laying out the right to control and 
agreement by the parties as two determinative elements for agency); see also Moorehead v. District of 
Columbia, 747 A.2d 138, 143 (D.C. 2000) (stating that “the power to control” is usually “the 
determinative factor” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
48. See Moorehead, 747 A.2d at 143. 
49. See, e.g., id. (rejecting respondeat superior claim involving special police officer); Blumberg, 
supra note 9, at 304 (calling agency “rigorously restricted”). 
50. See, e.g., Achtenberg, supra note 37, at 2199. 
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During those periods, vertical integration was more common than it is in today’s 
economy, meaning that large companies often directly employed workers provid-
ing the key inputs into the production process. For instance, early American 
tycoons such as Cornelius Vanderbilt, John Rockefeller, and Henry Ford used 
their own workers to build railroads, drill oil, and assemble automobile parts.51 
Because those vertically integrated companies handled so much of their business 
operations internally, respondeat superior still provided a means of imposing 
liability for a large array of harms.52 In other words, in this internal-to-the-firm 
context, respondeat superior did not have the same downfall. 
However, companies now often hire independent manufacturers and service 
providers, even for internal services like janitorial work, which they would have 
previously done through their own workforce.53 Those changes set the stage for 
the doctrine’s demise because the agency test proved restrictive in holding one 
business liable for the acts of third parties, such as among those relationships cre-
ated by this vertical disintegration.54 For instance, the black-letter law for torts is 
that a company is not responsible for the acts of independent contractors, except 
for certain “nondelegable” activities viewed as inherently dangerous or risky, 
such as road construction.55 
Especially in light of respondeat superior’s roots in master–servant relation-
ships,56 the modern business configuration that would seem most likely to meet 
the exacting test for agency is that between parent and subsidiary because the par-
ent company owns the subsidiary. Indeed, in the early twentieth century, many 
courts used agency law to hold parents liable for their subsidiaries’ harms by 
inferring control from some forms of ownership.57 However, courts eventually 
applied the same agency test to subsidiaries as to independent contractors, mean-
ing that the mere act of ownership was not enough to establish agency—active 
control was also necessary.58 
51. See, e.g., Sanjukta M. Paul, The Enduring Ambiguities of Antitrust Liability for Worker 
Collective Action, 47 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 969, 995–1013 (2016) (summarizing historical labor practices). 
52. See, e.g., id. at 972–74. 
53. See Brishen Rogers, Toward Third-Party Liability for Wage Theft, 31 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. 
L. 1, 16 (2010); see also George S. Geis, An Empirical Examination of Business Outsourcing 
Transactions, 96 VA. L. REV. 241, 242 (2010) (“Business outsourcing partnerships have become an 
increasingly common strategy for firms seeking to cut costs, upend their value chains, or focus on 
narrower slivers of competence.”). 
54. Courts rarely even held franchisors liable for the acts of franchisees in the 1990s. See Joseph H. 
King, Jr., Limiting the Vicarious Liability of Franchisors for the Torts of Their Franchisees, 62 WASH. 
& LEE L. REV. 417, 433, 436 (2005). 
55. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 409, 409 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 1965). The 
company’s label for a contractor does not matter as much as factors such as the control exercised. See id. 
§ 409 cmt. a. Certain nondelegable duties such as road construction were well established under the 
common law, whereas others evolved over time. See id. §§ 410, 416, 427; infra Section II.B. 
56. See John C. Tillotson, Vicarious Liability of Filling Station Oil Companies Under Respondeat 
Superior, 3 WASHBURN L.J. 88, 88–89 (1963). 
57. Robert B. Thompson, Agency Law and Asset Partitioning, 71 U. CIN. L. REV. 1321, 1326 (2003). 
58. See id. 
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According to some scholars, a wave of reorganizations subsequently occurred, 
motivated by the desire to move riskier activities from parent companies to more 
judgment-proof subsidiaries that the parent did not technically control.59 Given 
the varying motivations for such arrangements today—including cost savings 
from specialization60—it is difficult to know even roughly what percentage of 
modern outsourcing is motivated by a desire to evade liability. Nonetheless, there 
is reason to believe that the avoidance of respondeat superior was inefficient and 
perhaps had regressive distributional implications.61 Regardless of the reason for 
the outsourcing, those reorganizations—and outsourcing more broadly—marked 
the first phase of a fading respondeat superior because they began to make busi-
nesses less responsible for harms flowing from activities that produced their 
profits. 
B. THE STATUTORY RISE AND FALL 
To understand the full arc of third-party liability, it is necessary to look beyond 
the common law to judicial interpretation and application of statutes. Even 
though statutory liability by default incorporates common law liability principles, 
judges have at times interpreted statutes as imposing a higher level of liability. In 
the latter half of the twentieth century, on different timelines depending on the 
area of law, judges had grown bolder in imposing third-party liability for both in-
dependent contractors and subsidiaries. 
Federal discrimination laws helped shape the statutory trajectory for independ-
ent contractors because they culminated in multiple Supreme Court cases. 
Beginning in the 1970s, under the Fair Housing Act,62 courts held that the duty 
not to discriminate was nondelegable.63 A similar line of reasoning materialized 
in the employment context under the Enforcement Act of 1870, enacted pursuant 
to the Fourteenth Amendment.64 In a 1978 case, employers defended against 
charges that they had discriminated against twelve Black plaintiffs by pointing to 
an operating engineer union’s practices as the source of the discrimination.65 The 
court found that the employers could not delegate their duty not to discriminate.66 
The same case found independent grounds for holding those employers liable for 
the unions’ discrimination under the common law test for respondeat superior.67   
59. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 18, at 1881. 
60. See Geis, supra note 53. 
61. See infra Sections I.C, III.B.1. On the efficiency effects of common law evolution, see Frank 
Partnoy, Synthetic Common Law, 53 U. KAN. L. REV. 281, 291–97 (2005). 
62. 42 U.S.C. § 3601 (2018). 
63. See, e.g., Phiffer v. Proud Parrot Motor Hotel, Inc., 648 F.2d 548, 552 (9th Cir. 1980); Marr v. 
Rife, 503 F.2d 735, 741–42 (6th Cir. 1974). 
64. Pub. L. No. 41-114, § 16, 16 Stat. 140, 144 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2018)). 
65. Pennsylvania v. Local Union 542, Int’l Union of Operating Eng’rs, 469 F. Supp. 329, 335, 409, 
412 (E.D. Pa. 1978), aff’d, 648 F.2d 923 (3d Cir. 1981), rev’d, 458 U.S. 375 (1982). 
66. Id. 
67. Id. at 411–13. 
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In 1982, the Supreme Court began to curtail these expansions in General 
Building Contractors Ass’n v. Pennsylvania.68 It first reasoned that the relation-
ship between the employers and the union was insufficient to satisfy common law 
respondeat superior because the employers were not in a principal–agent relation-
ship with the union.69 Thus, one way the Court may have curtailed respondeat 
superior directly in statutory cases was by imposing a higher bar for agency than 
lower courts would have used. 
The Court went on to conclude that Congress, in drafting the Enforcement Act 
of 1870, had not intended for the statute to create a duty with respect to third par-
ties.70 This ruling relied on the Court’s prior understanding of congressional 
intent for the Enforcement Act.71 That emphasis on the particulars of a single stat-
ute allowed lower courts in the late 1980s and early 1990s to continue finding 
nondelegable duties in other statutes, such as the Fair Housing Act.72 
Liability for subsidiaries’ harms followed a roughly similar trajectory. In the 
late 1900s, courts increasingly held parents liable for the acts of subsidiaries by 
interpreting federal statutes as intending to impose liability on subsidiaries 
more broadly than what the common law would allow through veil piercing and 
agency law. Examples include the Comprehensive Environmental Response, 
Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA)73 and Employee Retirement Income 
Security Act (ERISA).74 
Although corporate law scholars paid limited attention to the implications of 
these trends for independent contractors, many responded in the 1990s with some 
enthusiasm to the parent–subsidiary rulings as a sign of an emerging “enterprise 
liability.”75 Enterprise liability views the various corporate pieces—including 
subsidiaries—as one entity.76 That approach was seen as a means of breaking 
through increasingly complex and diffuse corporate structures to hold the larger 
68. 458 U.S. 375 (1982). 
69. Id. at 393–94. 
70. Id. at 396–97. 
71. See id. 
72. See, e.g., Walker v. Crigler, 976 F.2d 900, 904 (4th Cir. 1992); Coates v. Bechtel, 811 F.2d 1045, 
1051 (7th Cir. 1987); Saunders v. Gen. Servs. Corp., 659 F. Supp. 1042, 1059 (E.D. Va. 1987). 
73. 42 U.S.C. § 9601 (2018); see New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1044–45 (2d Cir. 
1985); CPC Int’l, Inc. v. Aerojet–Gen. Corp., 777 F. Supp. 549, 571 (W.D. Mich. 1991), vacated sub 
nom. United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51 (1998). 
74. 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (2018); see, e.g., Alman v. Danin, 801 F.2d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1986) (using agency 
law to hold parent company liable for subsidiary’s failure to contribute to employee-benefit plans). 
75. See Phillip I. Blumberg, The Increasing Recognition of Enterprise Principles in Determining 
Parent and Subsidiary Corporation Liabilities, 28 CONN. L. REV. 295, 296 (1996); Peter S. Menell, 
Legal Advising on Corporate Structure in the New Era of Environmental Liability, 1990 COLUM. BUS. L. 
REV. 399, 406–08 (describing greater parent-corporation liability under CERCLA); Cindy A. Schipani, 
Infiltration of Enterprise Theory into Environmental Jurisprudence, 22 J. CORP. L. 599, 619 (1997). 
76. See Gregory C. Keating, The Theory of Enterprise Liability and Common Law Strict Liability, 54 
VAND. L. REV. 1285, 1287 (2001) (“Enterprise liability is a . . . modern theory of strict liability. . . [that] 
expresses the maxim that those who profit from the imposition of risk should bear the costs of the 
accidents that are a price of their profits.”). 
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corporation responsible.77 Yet the Supreme Court dealt a blow to that optimism at 
the turn of the twenty-first century. 
In the 1998 decision United States v. Bestfoods, a unanimous Court declined to 
hold a parent company liable for cleaning up a subsidiary chemical plant’s haz-
ardous waste.78 It thereby disagreed with a district court that had interpreted 
CERCLA as imposing liability broader than common law liability.79 Perhaps 
more importantly, the Court further cautioned that—in the absence of clear statu-
tory language—it was inappropriate in corporate liability cases to move beyond 
common law principles.80 Instead, judges should look to veil-piercing principles 
and agency law.81 Bestfoods thereby made it significantly less likely that a parent 
would be held liable for the acts of a subsidiary, whether under CERCLA or other 
statutes.82 
Several years later, the Court returned to the question of nondelegable duties in 
antidiscrimination legislation.83 Disagreeing with rules adopted in several juris-
dictions, the Court in Meyer v. Holley declined to hold the owner of a real estate 
corporation liable for its local broker’s refusal to sell to, and use of derogatory 
language about, a mixed-race couple.84 In an immediate sense, the ruling con-
fined the couple alleging racial discrimination to pursuing the claim against a 
financially troubled corporation and the local sales agent, neither of which had 
sufficient assets to make a lawsuit worthwhile.85 More broadly, the Court rea-
soned that because the Fair Housing Act had not explicitly mentioned a nondele-
gable duty, such silence permits “an inference that Congress intended to apply 
ordinary background tort principles,” which hinge on respondeat superior’s 
higher bar of common law agency.86 The ruling thus helped solidify courts’ diffi-
culty in reading nondelegable duties into federal statutes. 
In sum, for both corporate subsidiaries and independent contractors, by the late 
1900s, the law had edged toward greater liability for the acts that business organi-
zations had pushed outside the bounds of the firm. The Court’s turn-of-the- 
century rulings eroded what had become a promising statute-based avenue for 
adapting respondeat superior to an economy marked by fragmented business 
structures. 
77. See, e.g., Blumberg, supra note 75, at 296–97. 
78. 524 U.S. 51, 55 (1998). 
79. See id. at 59, 67. 
80. Id. at 63–64. 
81. Id. There is controversy around the relationship between agency law and veil piercing, but courts 
sometimes allow agency law to pierce the corporate veil. See Thompson, supra note 16. 
82. See, e.g., Thompson, supra note 57, at 1336. 
83. Meyer v. Holley, 537 U.S. 280, 290 (2003). 
84. Id. 
85. See Andrew Brownstein, Real-Estate Agency Owners Win Liability Protection in Supreme Court, 
TRIAL, Mar. 1, 2003, at 19. 
86. See Meyer, 537 U.S. at 286, 290. 
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C. SCHOLARLY NARRATIVES OF THE DECLINE 
Most corporate law observers have paid limited attention to the Court’s inde-
pendent contractor cases and indeed to independent contractors more broadly.87 
But some have argued that the modern, limited reach of respondeat superior 
causes inefficiency because it motivates businesses to avoid exerting control over 
potentially tortious activities by excessively using independent contractors.88 
Prominent observers also view Bestfoods as making subsidiaries more appeal-
ing89 and giving “the enterprise a substantial chance to essentially judgment proof 
itself.”90 Ironically, rather than ensuring that businesses closely monitor their 
employees to minimize harm, the Supreme Court’s vicarious liability jurispru-
dence “deters principals from using employee relationships in the very situation 
in which they are most needed.”91 
The weakness of third-party liability is a significant enough problem to have 
also animated numerous calls by legal scholars outside of corporate law to hold 
companies more liable for the acts of third parties in specific legal arenas. 
Proposals include allowing lawsuits against Internet service providers for sub-
scribers’ cyberbullying and intellectual property violations;92 
See, e.g., Bradley A. Areheart, Regulating Cyberbullies Through Notice-Based Liability, 117 
YALE L.J. POCKET PART 41 (2007), https://www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/regulating-cyberbullies- 
through-notice-based-liability [https://perma.cc/NQV4-8PQG]; Assaf Hamdani, Who’s Liable for 
Cyberwrongs?, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 901, 904 (2002); Doug Lichtman & Eric Posner, Holding Internet 
Service Providers Accountable, 14 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 221, 222 (2006). 
imposing strict 
liability when artificial intelligence harms third parties;93 
Anat Lior, AI Entities as AI Agents: Artificial Intelligence Liability and the AI Respondeat 
Superior Analogy, 46 MITCHELL HAMLINE L. REV. (forthcoming 2020) (manuscript at 3) (available at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Papers.cfm?abstract_id=3446115 [https://perma.cc/V58P-WRBK]). 
making employers 
strictly liable for wage violations that occur along the supply chain;94 holding 
banking, accounting, and legal gatekeepers liable for securities fraud;95 treating 
Amazon as a seller to ensure it pays consumers injured by products sold by third  
87. The bulk of scholars’ attention to vicarious liability has gone to parent–subsidiary relationships, 
and secondarily to corporate liability for employees’ acts, with typically at most a passing reference to 
independent contractors. See, e.g., Miriam H. Baer, Choosing Punishment, 92 B.U. L. REV. 577, 620 
(2012); Alan O. Sykes, The Boundaries of Vicarious Liability: An Economic Analysis of the Scope of 
Employment Rule and Related Legal Doctrines, 101 HARV. L. REV. 563, 582 (1988). 
88. Arlen & MacLeod, supra note 6, at 139–40. 
89. See, e.g., Thompson, supra note 57, at 1336 (noting the Bestfoods factors give “planners within 
corporate groups enormous room to structure their business in ways to limit liability”). 
90. E.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Abolishing Veil Piercing, 26 J. CORP. L. 479, 530 (2001). 
91. See Arlen & MacLeod, supra note 6, at 139. Some have lauded the limitations to liability, such as 
for helping innovation. See Mark A. Lemley & R. Anthony Reese, Reducing Digital Copyright 
Infringement Without Restricting Innovation, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1345, 1355–56, 1366 (2004). 
92. 
93. 
94. See Timothy P. Glynn, Taking the Employer Out of Employment Law? Accountability for Wage 
and Hour Violations in an Age of Enterprise Disaggregation, 15 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 201, 205 
(2011). 
95. See Frank Partnoy, Barbarians at the Gatekeepers?: A Proposal for a Modified Strict Liability 
Regime, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 491, 492 (2001). 
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parties;96 and imposing liability on oil companies even if they do not fully control 
the third parties responsible for oil spills.97 
These and other reform proposals respond to a doctrine perceived as insuffi-
cient to support third-party liability in the overwhelming majority of cases.98 The 
direst warning in the literature about such outsourcing is that “if the strategy of 
disaggregation is successful, it will bring the system full circle to where it was 
before respondeat superior and other forms of vicarious liability evolved.”99 In 
other words, the weakness of respondeat superior could mean that “[n]o entity . . . 
will be liable for the acts of any other, because all relationships will be among ‘in-
dependent contractors.’”100 
Still, much of the literature focuses on corporate organizational topics such as 
parent–subsidiary relationships, whereas most discussions of liability for independ-
ent contractors are decades old, focused on particular fields, or made in passing. 
Even in more recent field-specific studies of vicarious liability, the focus is typi-
cally not on independent contractors.101 Thus, the parent–subsidiary literature is 
incomplete, and there has been insufficient examination of how liability law inter-
sects with outsourcing at a time when that business practice has become pervasive. 
This Part has pieced together the foundations for understanding widespread 
concerns about the enfeeblement of a once-potent respondeat superior. The chief 
protagonists in that downfall were agency law and corporate organizational strat-
egy, both of which made it difficult to bring suits against large businesses for the 
acts of their subsidiaries or independent contractors. The demise of liability 
would be a concerning outcome given the ubiquity of businesses in society and 
the central role that liability plays in so many areas of law—from environmental 
to consumer protection to employment discrimination. There are normative 
reasons—based in efficiency, distribution, and the rule of law—to desire a third- 
party liability regime in which firms internalize the costs of doing business.102 
Fortunately, the organizational shifts that have threatened to stifle third-party 
liability must reckon with a countervailing sea change more recently enabled by 
developments in technology, markets, and governance. 
96. See Janger & Twerski, supra note 13, at 264. 
97. See Garry A. Gabison, Limited Solution to a Dangerous Problem: The Future of the Oil Pollution 
Act, 18 OCEAN & COASTAL L.J. 223, 239 (2013). 
98. For other proposals, see, for example, Lynn M. LoPucki, Toward a Trademark-Based Liability 
System, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1099, 1103 (2002) (proposing a liability regime that follows trademark law, 
making the franchisor vicariously liable for the acts of its franchisees). In specific fields, some authors 
recognize that vicarious liability has increased. See, e.g., Lemley & Reese, supra note 91, at 1366 
(observing that in copyright, “[v]icarious liability for infringement committed by a third party has 
expanded in recent years”). 
99. LoPucki, supra note 1, at 66. 
100. Id. 
101. See, e.g., Rogers, supra note 53, at 13 (noting that the article does not address the second main 
employment law issue related to independent contractor status). 
102. See infra Section III.B. 
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II. THE REVIVAL AND EVOLUTION OF THIRD-PARTY LIABILITY 
The Supreme Court’s turn-of-the-century jurisprudence may have marked a 
significant setback for third-party liability, but it left open two main avenues for a 
comeback. Most immediately, future litigants still have the option of satisfying 
the common law test for respondeat superior. Additionally, regulators and legisla-
tors could directly impose nondelegable duties rather than relying on judges to 
read them into statutes. This Part offers examples of significant legal movement 
in both of these areas, encouraged by technological advances. The breadth and 
timing of these developments not only provides evidence of a resurgence of 
third-party liability, but also call into question the extent of the original decline. 
A. REVIVING COMMON LAW AGENCY 
The common law test for agency remains important to third-party liability 
because it is necessary not only for state torts but also many federal statutes 
when they are silent on the issue of third-party liability.103 The domain of silent 
statutes is large, including significant legislation in antitrust,104 consumer 
protection,105 environmental,106 intellectual property,107 and antidiscrimi- 
nation,108 among others.109 Thus, when a company enters into an agency rela-
tionship with a third party, it becomes more likely to be liable under a broad swath 
of laws. Because control of the third party is central to agency analyses,110 this 
Section focuses on technological and governance enhancement of control. 
1. Technological Control 
Information technologies have reconstructed industrial organizations and rela-
tionships in ways that may constitute new mechanisms for establishing agency.  
103. See, e.g., Meyer v. Holley, 537 U.S. 280, 286 (2003) (stating the rule for federal statutes); 
Schramm v. Foster, 341 F. Supp. 2d 536, 543–46 (D. Md. 2004) (applying agency law to a respondeat 
superior analysis under state tort law). 
104. See Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 12 (2018); In re Sugar Indus. Antitrust Litig., 579 F.2d 13, 18 (3d 
Cir. 1978) (failing to find explicit guidance on third-party liability). 
105. See, e.g., Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 41 (2018); Telephone Consumer 
Protection Act of 1991 (TCPA), 47 U.S.C. § 227 (2018); P.F. Collier & Son Corp. v. FTC, 427 F.2d 261, 
267 (6th Cir. 1970) (applying the FTC Act); DISH Network, LLC, 28 FCC Rcd. 6574, 6584 (2013) 
(applying the TCPA). 
106. See, e.g., Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 
(CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. § 9601 (2018); United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51, 62–70 (1998) (applying 
CERCLA). 
107. Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc., 797 F.3d 1020, 1023 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (en 
banc) (per curiam) (applying the Patent Act); Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 261– 
62 (9th Cir. 1996) (applying the Copyright Act). 
108. See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000 (2018); Fair Housing Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 3601 (2018); Meyer, 537 U.S. at 282 (applying the Fair Housing Act); Cilecek v. Inova Health Sys. 
Servs., 115 F.3d 256, 259–60 (4th Cir. 1997) (applying Title VII of the Civil Rights Act). 
109. Other statutes include the Commodity Exchange Act. 7 U.S.C. § 1 (2018); see Corn Prods. Ref. 
Co. v. Benson, 232 F.2d 554, 564–65 (2d Cir. 1956) (applying the Commodity Exchange Act). 
110. See supra note 47 and accompanying text. 
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The agency law test for control is flexible and has many factors, but courts essen-
tially look for the power to “police” the third party for violations.111 
a. Three Doctrinal Components: Monitoring, Instructions, and Punishment 
Policing can be broken down under the agency test into three root components: 
monitoring, providing instructions, and punishing.112 Technology has advanced 
all of these components, although it is most relevant to monitoring and providing 
instructions. 
In terms of monitoring, per the Third Restatement of Agency, the right to con-
trol includes the right “to assess the agent’s performance.”113 Accordingly, for 
courts to allow third-party liability claims to proceed, plaintiffs typically must 
show that principals knew of the wrongful acts or could have reasonably obtained 
such knowledge.114 Targets and mechanisms of the monitoring come in diverse 
forms. For example, a flea market operator demonstrates the ability to detect 
copyright infringements by sending employees to walk the aisles to enforce 
rules.115 The ability to audit business records or inspect the agent’s premises can 
also show control.116 
Legal scholars have previously observed in other contexts that private monitor-
ing was limited “because full observation of [an] agent’s actions [was] either 
impossible or prohibitively costly.”117 Even through much of the industrial era— 
the period in which the respondeat superior doctrine integrated agency principles 
for independent contractors—remote monitoring was a labor-intensive pro-
cess.118 For example, Henry Ford hired private investigators to keep tabs on  
111. See, e.g., Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1174 (9th Cir. 2007) (“Google 
lacks the practical ability to police the infringing activities of third-party websites.”); A&M Records, 
Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1023 (9th Cir. 2001) (“Napster had the right and ability to police its 
system and failed to exercise that right to prevent the exchange of copyrighted material.”); Shapiro, 
Bernstein & Co. v. H. L. Green Co., 316 F.2d 304, 308–09 (2d Cir. 1963) (emphasizing the store 
owner’s power to police concessionaires). 
112. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 cmt. f(1) (AM. LAW INST. 2006). There is great 
variation in judicial approaches to the agency control test for purposes of third-party liability. Although 
listed together, these three elements are weighted differently. See, e.g., United States v. Bonds, 608 F.3d 
495, 515–17 (9th Cir. 2010) (Bea, J., dissenting) (applying comment f(1), and arguing that Barry Bonds’ 
ability to assess and instruct his trainer and “[m]ost importantly” terminate their relationship created a 
principal–agent relationship). 
113. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 cmt. f(1) (AM. LAW INST. 2006). 
114. See, e.g., Engate, Inc. v. Esquire Deposition Servs., LLC, 236 F. Supp. 2d 912, 914–15 (N.D. Ill. 
2002) (dismissing claim partly due to defendants’ lack of knowledge of contractors’ illegal activity). 
115. See Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 262–63 (9th Cir. 1996); Polygram Int’l 
Publ’g, Inc. v. Nevada/TIG, Inc., 855 F. Supp. 1314, 1328 (D. Mass. 1994). 
116. See, e.g., J.M. v. Shell Oil Co., 922 S.W.2d 759, 764 (Mo. 1996) (en banc) (holding that the 
factual issue of whether an oil company controlled a gas station when it regulated daily activities and 
performed routine inspections precluded summary judgment). 
117. Asaf Eckstein, Skin in the Game for Credit Rating Agencies and Proxy Advisors: Reality Meets 
Theory, 7 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 221, 222–23 (2017). 
118. See generally Carlson, supra note 41 (reviewing the history of respondeat superior). 
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employees outside of work and walked his factory floors with a stopwatch to 
improve assembly-line efficiency.119 
Today, companies deploy controversial surveillance of workers, consumers, 
and independent contractors through cameras, identity tags, apps, remote com-
puter screenshots, and other devices that often leverage artificial intelligence.120 
By way of illustration, banks can silently join or listen to recordings of independ-
ent call centers’ phone conversations to search for consumer protection 
violations. Those approaches provide considerable advancement in oversight 
compared to sending someone out to the call centers in person.121 Amazon uses 
an app to track its independent delivery contractors’ routes to their destinations, 
and its dispatchers can call the contractors if they are late or other problems 
arise.122 Not only are these technologies a far cry from the days of Ford’s stop-
watch, but they also demonstrate how the same technologies that enhance moni-
toring also enable another important component of the doctrinal test: the delivery 
of instructions. 
Under the Third Restatement of Agency, the “power to give interim instruc-
tions . . . is the hallmark of an agency relationship.”123 For all large companies, in-
formation technologies more readily allow interim instructions because it is now 
more cost-effective than before to collect the information necessary to assess 
what has been done incorrectly and to communicate the preferred behavior.124 It 
is also now a widespread practice to engage in such feedback-oriented monitor-
ing.125 A separate but more uncertain argument is that when large companies pro-
vide the technological interface used by third parties—as an array of companies, 
including financial institutions, increasingly do—those platforms set the technical 
terms of how third-party companies connect to their systems. Thus, the more a 
large company adopts surveillance technologies and provides the technological 
means of interface, the more it may be seen as satisfying the monitoring and 
instructions components of the agency test. 
In terms of the doctrinal emphasis on punishment, the link is more nebulous 
and variable. Nonetheless, technology’s enhancement of punishment may con-
tribute evidence of control in some contexts. In particular, online platforms offer 
a mechanism for other parties to come together. Amazon connects buyers and 
119. Ifeoma Ajunwa, Kate Crawford & Jason Schultz, Limitless Worker Surveillance, 105 CALIF. L. 
REV. 735, 741 (2017) (summarizing the history of employer surveillance). 
120. See id. at 742–45; see also Rebecca Crootof, The Internet of Torts: Expanding Civil Liability 
Standards to Address Corporate Remote Interference, 69 DUKE L.J. 583, 505, 596–600 (2019) 
(discussing how Internet-connected devices, collectively known as the “Internet of Things,” enable 
companies to surveil). 
121. See Citibank, N.A., CFPB No. 2015-CFPB-0015, at 12–13 (July 21, 2015) (consent order). 
122. Patricia Callahan, When Fast, Free Shipping Delivers Heartbreak, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 5, 2019, at 
A1. 
123. Smith v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 30 F. Supp. 3d 765, 776 (N.D. Ill. 2014) (quoting 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 cmt. f(1) (AM. LAW INST. 2006)). 
124. See Ajunwa et al., supra note 119, at 742–45, 745 fig.1 (summarizing features of information 
technology). 
125. See id. at 743. 
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sellers, Uber connects drivers and passengers, YouTube connects content pro-
viders and viewers, and Facebook connects app developers and users. Control of 
the platforms means the ability to punish providers by cutting off that vital access. 
For example, Amazon regularly delists sellers who do not comply with its poli-
cies, such as when it suspects they have paid for fake reviews to buoy their 
sales.126 
See, e.g., Rory Van Loo, Federal Rules of Platform Procedure, 88 U. CHI. L. REV. (forthcoming 
2021) (manuscript at 2) (available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3576562 
[https://perma.cc/TWR7-EWVL]) (summarizing how platforms sanction users). 
Another way that technology may enhance punishment, broadly construed, is 
by promoting increasingly concentrated markets. Many information technologies 
create network effects. For instance, the more of an individual’s friends who are 
on Facebook, the more valuable Facebook becomes to that individual.127 
Additionally, the accumulation of big data may create barriers to entry.128 In these 
and other ways, technology can lead to fewer companies, each with greater mar-
ket shares. In more concentrated markets, the termination of an account by 
Amazon of a small seller or by Facebook of an app developer can be devastating 
because it leaves fewer alternatives than would be the case if there were many 
ways to reach users. Thus, in theory, technologies can enhance monitoring, 
instructions, and punishment. 
b. Signs that Courts Are Moving Toward a Technological Revival 
This combination of monitoring, instructions, and punishment may help 
explain why courts have allowed agency control claims to proceed in a number of 
online contexts. For example, in cases against Napster and Alibaba, judges have 
ruled that platforms can sufficiently “police” wrongdoing for purposes of agency 
control if they can search the activities that occur on their networks and “termi-
nate users.”129 A court also has found that PayPal plausibly controlled third-party 
point-of-sale partners by setting the parameters for software interface with its 
payment system, including providing a software instruction booklet.130 
It is important to recognize that many of these instances of liability are not nec-
essarily only about technology companies but also reflect the technological 
126. 
127. See Maurice E. Stucke & Ariel Ezrachi, How Digital Assistants Can Harm Our Economy, 
Privacy, and Democracy, 32 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1239, 1245 (2017). 
128. See Steven C. Salop, Invigorating Vertical Merger Enforcement, 127 YALE L.J. 1962, 1989 
(2018). 
129. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1024 (9th Cir. 2001) (“Napster . . . has the 
ability to locate infringing material listed on its search indices, and the right to terminate users’ access to 
the system. The file name indices, therefore, are within the ‘premises’ that Napster has the ability to 
police.”); Keck v. Alibaba.com Hong Kong Ltd., 369 F. Supp. 3d 932, 937–38 (N.D. Cal. 2019) 
(“Defendants failed to police their websites/marketplaces to the fullest extent . . . .”). Intellectual 
property subtleties are worth examining further but are beyond the scope of this Article. 
130. Ioengine, LLC v. Paypal Holdings, Inc., No. 18-452-WCB, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12195, at 
*7–10, 14 (D. Del. Jan. 25, 2019); see also Pers. Audio, LLC v. Google, Inc., No. 1:15-CV-350, 2017 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 122635, at *14–15 (E.D. Tex. May 15, 2017) (relying heavily on Google’s practice of 
providing computerized instructions to third parties for its Google Play, and allowing a patent claim to 
survive summary judgment on the issue of control). 
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evolution of traditional industries. As one example, for over one hundred years, it 
was well-established law that cruise ship owners were not liable for negligent 
medical care provided on board.131 In 2014, however, a federal court upended 
that precedent by reasoning that telemedicine advances enabled shipowners to 
supervise medical care remotely, indicating that companies could be held liable 
for the negligent acts of their onboard medical employees.132 
As another example, courts have come to widely varying conclusions about 
how to classify taxi drivers but have often held that taxi companies were not 
liable because they lacked control over drivers.133 In contrast, in various cases 
alleging that Uber drivers assaulted passengers, courts have ruled in the plaintiffs’ 
favor on the control issue by finding that drivers are employees.134 To support 
those decisions, judges cite Uber’s technological tools, including regular smart-
phone communications, algorithmically monitored limits to drivers’ ability to re-
fuse rides, and use of user ratings to influence driver performance.135 Judicial 
approaches to cruise line and ride-hailing cases illustrate how some courts are al-
ready implicitly aware that technology presses business relationships toward 
agency. It remains to be seen whether courts’ treatment of Uber reflects their 
emerging approach to platform liability. 
Courts have sometimes declined to find sufficient control when the harmful 
conduct occurred on third-party websites to which the platforms link.136 And 
online platforms still enjoy explicit statutory protection in some contexts, such as  
131. See, e.g., Barbetta v. S/S Bermuda Star, 848 F.2d 1364, 1370 (5th Cir. 1988) (basing decision 
not to “impute the doctor’s negligence” onto a cruise liner on “a rule of law which courts that have 
considered the question for the last one hundred years have embraced”). 
132. See Franza v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd., 772 F.3d 1225, 1248 (11th Cir. 2014) (finding that 
cruise lines “proudly advertise” their land-based telemedicine departments, which enhance the ability of 
shipowners to supervise medical staff onboard). 
133. See, e.g., Yellow Taxi Co. of Minneapolis v. NLRB, 721 F.2d 366, 381 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (“The 
freedom to conduct 95 percent of one’s business independently dwarfs the significance of whatever 
control might inhere in the commercial contracts.”); Ali v. U.S.A. Cab Ltd., 98 Cal. Rptr. 3d 568, 572, 
581 (Ct. App. 2009) (finding insufficient evidence of control for purposes of vicarious liability). But see 
City Cab Co. of Orlando v. NLRB, 628 F.2d 261, 262, 265 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (upholding decision that taxi 
drivers were employees under significant control due to factors such as the taxi company’s dress code 
for drivers). In these cases, the courts have looked predominately at the (1) extent to which the company 
holds drivers accountable for income; (2) regulation of hours; (3) right to select passengers; 
(4) independent versus company goodwill; and (5) dress codes. See id. at 264–65. 
134. See, e.g., Doe v. Uber Techs., Inc., 184 F. Supp. 3d 774, 782 (N.D. Cal. 2016); Search v. Uber 
Techs., Inc., 128 F. Supp. 3d 222, 232–34 (D.D.C. 2015); see also Nancy Leong & Aaron Belzer, The 
New Public Accommodations: Race Discrimination in the Platform Economy, 105 GEO. L.J. 1271, 1311 
(2017) (concluding that Uber and Airbnb can be sued for intentional discrimination by hosts and 
drivers). These suits may nonetheless fail for other reasons, such as whether the alleged wrongdoing was 
within the scope of employment. See, e.g., Phillips v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. 16 Civ. 295 (DAB), 2017 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94979, at *14–19 (S.D.N.Y. June 14, 2017) (finding that assault was not foreseeable 
incident of employment). 
135. Doe, 184 F. Supp. 3d at 782; Search, 128 F. Supp. 3d at 233. 
136. See, e.g., Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1175–76 (9th Cir. 2007) (finding 
that neither Amazon nor Google exerted control over the infringing material because it occurred on 
third-party websites rather than on Amazon’s or Google’s platforms). 
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for publishing copyright violations and defamation by third parties.137 The law also 
does not impose liability for all manners of contractor outsourcing. For instance, 
Amazon has sometimes managed to evade liability for accidents caused by its con-
tractors in delivering billions of packages each year, even though it “directs the des-
tinations, deadlines and routes for its network of contract delivery drivers.”138 
However, the case law indicates that for activities that occur on their own sys-
tems, platforms’ inherent ease of monitoring and blocking users can be persua-
sive evidence of agency.139 Stated otherwise, the doctrine of respondeat superior 
may be evolving to recognize early scholars’ observation that “code is cyberspa-
ce’s ‘law,’”140 and that the writers of that code exert tremendous control.141 
These signs of the agency relationship evolving with platforms carries more 
significance than simply holding a new tech industry to a standard of stricter 
liability. The most valuable U.S. companies today operate sizeable online plat-
forms.142 
See Fortune 500, FORTUNE, https://fortune.com/fortune500/search/ (last visited Aug. 18, 2020) 
(identifying Microsoft, Apple, Amazon, Alphabet, and Facebook as the five largest companies by 
market value as of March 31, 2020). 
The scale of the platform economy alone—if courts hold online plat-
forms liable for third-party harms—would significantly increase the modern 
influence of respondeat superior. 
More importantly, the judicial treatment of online platforms may provide a 
window into the future of other markets. Like taxis, many traditional industries 
are migrating toward online platforms. Airbnb dominates the vacation rental mar-
ket. One of the oldest U.S. banks, Citigroup, closed thousands of branches nation-
wide and now mostly relies on smartphones and other technological interfaces.143 
Telis Demos, No Branch, No Problem. Citigroup Bets Big on Digital Banking., WALL ST. J. 
(May 12, 2019, 5:01 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/no-branch-no-problem-citigroup-bets-big-on- 
digital-banking-11557662401. 
Other large financial institutions, many of which operate payment platforms, are 
also transforming technologically such that they are arguably now all fintechs.144 
137. See Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, § 202(c), 112 Stat. 2860, 287–81 
(1998) (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 512(c) (2018)); Communications Act of 1934 § 230, 47 U.S.C. § 230 
(2018). For a few examples from the voluminous literature on this subject, see Eric Goldman, The 
Complicated Story of FOSTA and Section 230, 17 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 279, 279–80 (2019); Danielle 
Keats Citron, Cyber Civil Rights, 89 B.U. L. REV. 61, 116 (2009); Daphne Keller, The Right Tools: 
Europe’s Intermediary Liability Laws and the EU 2016 General Data Protection Regulation, 33 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 287, 295 (2018); Jeff Kosseff, Defending Section 230: The Value of Intermediary 
Immunity, 15 J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 123, 124–25 (2010). 
138. Callahan, supra note 122; see also infra note 185 and accompanying text (explaining how 
Amazon avoids product liability). 
139. This can be seen in both the cases finding liability for conduct on the platforms, as well as cases 
where the conduct did not give rise to liability on third-party platforms. See supra notes 133–36 and 
accompanying text. It also can arguably be inferred from judicially approved settlements between 
companies such as Amazon, Google, and Facebook with the FTC—although other sources of authority 
may be at work there. See infra Section II.B. 
140. LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE 5 (2d ed. 2006) 
141. Cf. id. at 5–6 (describing the regulatory power of code). 
142. 
143. 
144. Rory Van Loo, Making Innovation More Competitive: The Case of Fintech, 65 UCLA L. REV. 
232, 240 (2018). 
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Thus, the documented downfall of respondeat superior coincided with the birth 
of innovations that ultimately strengthen the case for liability. Many large firms’ 
mass surveillance capabilities and technologically enhanced market power move 
them toward greater control over third-party businesses under the common law 
agency test. An age characterized by data and platforms may meaningfully help 
reverse the decline of a doctrine born in an era of horses and carriages. 
2. Gatekeeper Governance Control 
Commentators have yet to consider in any sustained manner how new modes 
of governance are altering the common law test for agency. Of particular rele-
vance is federal regulators’ recent, widespread conscription of the world’s largest 
firms to oversee their smaller service providers for legal violations, or what can 
be described as mandated gatekeeping.145 The FTC ordered Facebook to oversee 
small app developers that collect data; the CFPB told banks to prevent call cen-
ters from deceiving consumers; and the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) 
told pharmaceutical companies to ensure their suppliers exercise safety 
precautions.146 Various corporate law pressures, such as increased compliance 
demanded by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,147 also can contribute to third- 
party oversight.148 Although different from common law respondeat superior, 
these shifts may influence the common law agency test by increasing monitoring, 
ratification, and punishment. 
a. Monitoring 
At the very least, gatekeeper mandates are worth considering in the context of 
third-party liability because one strategy that firms have deployed is to limit their 
visibility into the third party’s affairs, which later enables them to claim that they 
should not be expected to have known.149 Gatekeeper regulatory mandates make 
those self-blinding strategies ineffective. For instance, Facebook responded to the 
FTC’s enforcement order by instituting questionnaires of all service providers 
about their security architecture followed by select audits.150 The audits included 
activities such as “testing of the service provider’s controls, a vulnerability scan-
ning program, a web application penetration test, and/or a code review for secu-
rity defects.”151 Courts emphasize the rights reserved in determining what  
145. See generally Van Loo, supra note 23 (describing how private businesses have become 
regulatory enforcers of other private businesses). 
146. See id. at 482, 485, 492. 
147. Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as amended in Titles 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29 of the 
U.S. Code). 
148. See Rory Van Loo, Regulatory Monitors: Policing Firms in the Compliance Era, 119 COLUM. 
L. REV. 369, 398 (2019). 
149. FTC v. Lifewatch Inc., 176 F. Supp. 3d 757, 773 (N.D. Ill. 2016) (“Lifewatch’s ostrich-like 
approach to its telemarketers’ compliance with the law is extremely troubling.”). 
150. Facebook Compliance Report at 9, Facebook, Inc., No. C-4365 (F.T.C. Nov. 13, 2012). 
151. Id. at 10. 
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knowledge the principal could have obtained,152 and they assess the degree of 
“visibility” into the agent’s affairs, which can be established by both the fre-
quency and breadth of the monitoring.153 For firms ordered to undertake such 
extensive third-party monitoring, it will be difficult to avoid the perception of 
having visibility into a large sphere of activity. 
b. Ratification 
These extensive monitoring programs also speak to another avenue that firms 
use to argue against responsibility for the acts of third parties. In some legal con-
texts, once control is established, the agency analysis then asks whether the 
alleged harms in question were within the scope of authority granted.154 The prin-
cipal will not be held liable for activities outside the scope of authority.155 That 
requirement allows firms to offer a contractor “gone-rogue” defense, claiming 
that the illicit activity was unauthorized.156 
There is another path to establishing liability even if it is unclear that the agent 
had authority to act in a particular manner: subsequent ratification.157 A business 
“may ratify an act by failing to object to it or to repudiate it” or by “receiving or 
retaining [the] benefits it generates.”158 Either knowledge of the act or willful ig-
norance is necessary for ratification.159 
For instance, in the 2019 case Henderson v. United Student Aid Funds, Inc., 
the Ninth Circuit considered whether the financial institution, USA Funds, should 
pay for third-party debt collectors’ violations of the Telephone Consumer 
Protection Act (TCPA).160 In particular, an audit of USA Funds revealed evidence  
152. See, e.g., Lawyers Title Ins. Corp. v. Phillips Title Agency, 361 F. Supp. 2d 443, 448–50 (D.N.J. 
2005) (finding a title agency could be liable for the fraudulent actions of its independent contractors 
because it was contractually obligated to oversee the contractors’ behavior). 
153. See Dobkin v. Enter. Fin. Grp., Inc., No. 2:14-cv-01989 (WHW)(CLW), 2014 WL 4354070, at 
*4 (D.N.J. Sept. 3, 2014). 
154. Authority is more relevant to liability in the context of contracts than of torts. See RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF AGENCY § 6.01 (AM. LAW INST. 2006). The paths to establishing authority can be 
summarized as actual authority, apparent authority, and ratification. Id. §§ 2.02(1), 2.03, 4.01(1). 
155. See, e.g., Fidelity Nat’l Title Ins. Co. v. Mussman, 930 N.E.2d 1160, 1168 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) 
(“Fidelity’s authority to audit ITC’s escrow accounts does not convert ITC’s limited agency to issue title 
insurance commitments and policies into a broader general agency in which Fidelity has vicarious 
liability as the principal.”). 
156. See Life Alert Emergency Response, Inc. v. LifeWatch, Inc., 601 F. App’x 469, 474 (9th Cir. 
2015) (“The district court did not buy this story of telemarketers-gone-rogue, and neither do we.”). 
157. The main paths to authority are actual authority, apparent authority, and ratification. See supra 
note 154. Each path provides an independent basis for authority. Thus, all that is needed to show an 
expansion of the agency test is to show that at least one of the paths has become more likely. See 
Harrison v. Legacy Hous., LP, GPLH, LC, 324 F. Supp. 3d 1288, 1300 (M.D. Ga. 2018); supra note 154. 
After ratification, it is as if the agent had actual authority at the time of the act. See, e.g., J’Carpc, LLC v. 
Wilkins, 545 F. Supp. 2d 1330, 1337 (N.D. Ga. 2008). 
158. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 4.01 cmts. f, g (AM. LAW INST. 2006). 
159. See id. at § 4.06 cmts. b, d. 
160. 918 F.3d 1068, 1071 (9th Cir. 2019). 
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consistent with the illegal combination of both auto dialers and skip tracing.161 
The lender’s “audit findings combined with its knowledge about common prac-
tices in the industry should have alerted USA Funds that it needed to investigate 
further.”162 Its subsequent failure to do so, and silence on the matter, could have 
plausibly shown that USA Funds had actual knowledge of the violations or rati-
fied those acts through willful ignorance.163 
Henderson shows how once a company’s third-party monitoring program 
uncovers evidence of wrongdoing, any failure to investigate further or take steps 
to end the practice can set the company up for the ratification of illegal acts.164 
Although there still needs to be a connection between the business relationship 
and the act of wrongdoing,165 extensive monitoring programs can increase liabil-
ity risks in some contexts even when the large firm did not authorize the specific 
acts of wrongdoing. 
c. Punishment 
Control can be defined as the “legal right to stop or limit” harmful behavior 
and the “practical ability to do so.”166 Though monitoring is indicative of control, 
even more important is an enforcement mechanism—or means of punishment.167 
Principals typically enforce through the ability to terminate the agent’s participa-
tion in some kind of business activity. The principal enhances such authority by 
reserving the right to exit the contract with the agent at any point.168 Termination 
may also mean blocking the agent from a venue over which the principal has con-
trol, such as a marketplace.169 
Much of the regulatory gatekeeper strategy rests on mandating that large busi-
nesses wield their influence to keep smaller businesses in line. To that end, regu-
lators instruct large firms to contractually reserve the right to exit the business 
161. Id. at 1072 n.1, 1075 (finding violation of TCPA for practice of “obtaining previously-unknown 
[sic] phone numbers associated with the name on an account, such as by contracting with ‘third-party 
database services’ or by ‘calling an individual’s relatives [and] known acquaintances’” (second 
alteration in original) (quoting deposition of senior director of operations of student loan provider)). 
162. Id. at 1076. 
163. Id. 
164. See id. at 1075–76; see also Johansen v. HomeAdvisor, Inc., 218 F. Supp. 3d 577, 587–88 (S.D. 
Ohio 2016) (examining the theory of ratification based on constructive knowledge when the principal 
should have but failed to investigate further). 
165. See Johansen, 218 F. Supp. 3d at 587. 
166. E.g., Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1173–74 (9th Cir. 2007) (concluding 
that “Google lacks the practical ability to police the infringing activities of third-party websites”). 
167. See Whitfield v. Century 21 Real Estate Corp., 484 F. Supp. 984, 986 (S.D. Tex. 1979) 
(acknowledging that the ability to conduct annual audits demonstrated “a certain amount of control,” but 
finding no agency relationship because Century 21 had no “provision for any direct input” and had not 
“reserved for itself the authority to supervise or control” the franchise). 
168. See, e.g., Carlson, supra note 41, at 345 (“[A]n employer’s unrestricted right to discharge is 
inconsistent with the worker’s status as an independent contractor . . . .”); Robert B. Hocutt, The Filling 
Station Operator: Agent or Independent Contractor, 3 INTRAMURAL L. REV. WAKE FOREST C. 41, 45 
(1967) (observing that “an option to cancel the agreement on short written notice” is indicative of 
control). 
169. See Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 262–63 (9th Cir. 1996). 
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relationship if the third party does not comply with the law.170 For instance, the 
CFPB issued a guidance bulletin stating that financial institutions should include 
“in the contract with the service provider clear expectations about compliance, as 
well as appropriate and enforceable consequences for violating any compliance- 
related responsibilities.”171 
BUREAU OF CONSUMER FIN. PROT., COMPLIANCE BULLETIN AND POLICY GUIDANCE; 2016-02, 
SERVICE PROVIDERS (Oct. 31, 2016), https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/102016_cfpb_ 
OfficialGuidanceServiceProviderBulletin.pdf [https://perma.cc/NA6S-UDQK]. 
When a firm has the ability to exit the relationship at any point, it has practical 
leverage in delivering instructions because any failure to comply could cost the 
third party a valuable stream of revenue.172 Moreover, the contractual ability to 
exit satisfies courts’ emphasis on the legal right to stop behavior.173 Gatekeeping 
governance thus thrusts firms toward agency by mandating that large firms have 
the practical ability and legal right to stop harmful behavior. 
Overall, given the flexible tests for establishing multiple paths to agency, 
judges sometimes emphasize context-specific elements that would not be influ-
enced by the new gatekeeper enhancement of monitoring, ratification, and pun-
ishment.174 Courts’ doctrinal flexibility makes it difficult to predict the precise 
impact of governance shifts on a finding of agency in any given case. 
However, a common refrain in judicial opinions denying vicarious liability is 
that prior cases finding liability involved “something more.”175 Pervasive new 
gatekeeper mandates by regulators drive firms toward a greater level of involve-
ment in overseeing third parties in terms of being able to monitor and to punish 
whenever they choose. Governance mandates and powerful surveillance technol-
ogies may thus provide that “something more” that establishes greater control or 
ratification sufficient for third-party liability. 
B. EVOLVING LIABILITIES 
The discussion so far has focused on indirectly pushing companies toward 
greater liability through the common law agency test, but a more direct path 
exists. Legal authorities can impose a nondelegable duty or strict liability 
170. See Van Loo, supra note 23, at 501–02. 
171. 
172. See Van Loo, supra note 23, at 501 (“Big businesses are expected to enforce . . . by blocking 
access to markets.”). The extent of this exit threat depends largely on the principal’s market power, 
which will be greater in more concentrated industries. See id. at 514–15. 
173. See, e.g., Hodgin v. UTC Fire & Sec. Ams. Corp., 885 F.3d 243, 252–53 (4th Cir. 2018). But see 
Kristensen v. Credit Payment Servs. Inc., 879 F.3d 1010, 1015 (9th Cir. 2018). 
174. For instance, in one case the plaintiff sufficiently alleged authority by asserting, among other 
things, that the telemarketer employees represented themselves as calling on behalf of the alleged 
principal. See Dobkin v. Enter. Fin. Grp., Inc., No. 2:14-cv-01989 (WHW)(CLW), 2014 WL 4354070, 
at *4 (D.N.J. Sept. 3, 2014). Gatekeeper governance is probably irrelevant to that consideration. 
175. See, e.g., Engate, Inc. v. Esquire Deposition Servs., LLC, 236 F. Supp. 2d 912, 914–15 (N.D. Ill. 
2002) (“The cases in which vicarious liability has been imposed all involved something more than exists 
here.”); Conn, supra note 37, at 186 (explaining “[i]f the ‘actual’ relationship is akin to that of an 
employee/employer relationship,” then there is a higher likelihood of finding agency); see also Thomas 
v. Taco Bell Corp., 879 F. Supp. 2d 1079, 1086 (C.D. Cal. 2012) (“[K]nowledge, approval, and fund 
administration . . . fall[] short of establishing [direction or control].”). 
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regardless of whether another actor more immediately caused the harm. A nonde-
legable duty can come from the common law or statutes. 
1. Judicial Developments 
The most familiar set of nondelegable duties comes from tort law. For a certain 
set of inherently dangerous activities or those that pose a “peculiar risk,” like con-
struction on public roads or digging ditches,176 the common law did not allow one 
party to evade tort liability by delegating to another—even to an independent 
contractor.177 When scholars and judges frequently characterize the law as not 
holding companies liable for the acts of independent contractors except in limited 
circumstances, by “limited circumstances” they often mean those common law 
tort nondelegable duties.178 
Courts, at times, have created new nondelegable duties by finding that an activ-
ity posed a peculiar risk. For example, in Wislon v. Good Humor Corp., a three- 
year-old girl was struck and killed by traffic while crossing the street to reach an 
ice cream truck.179 The court found no evidence of sufficient control to establish 
an agency relationship between the larger ice cream manufacturer and the smaller 
ice cream truck company.180 Nonetheless, the court held that the exception for a 
peculiar risk applied because the ice cream manufacturer knew of the dangers of 
a curbside vendor playing music and offering products attractive to children 
while on a busy street.181 Although courts have sometimes expanded common 
law tort nondelegable duties, they are mostly limited to physical harms.182 
Product liability law offers another area in which courts created third-party 
liability. In the 1800s, it was rare for a plaintiff to win on product liability law-
suits. But in the 1960s, the California Supreme Court implemented a strict liabil-
ity regime that would hold all participants in the chain of distribution—from  
176. See, e.g., Wilkey v. Rouse Constr. Co., 28 S.W.2d 674, 676–77 (Mo. Ct. App. 1930) (holding a 
contractor vicariously liable for its subcontractor’s negligence in constructing a bridge on a public 
highway because the work was inherently dangerous); Beckman v. Butte–Silver Bow Cty., 1 P.3d 348, 
353–54 (Mont. 2000) (holding a contractor vicariously liable for its subcontractor’s failure to take 
precautions to reduce the unreasonable risks associated with digging a trench because “[t]renching 
operations of this nature are intrinsically or inherently dangerous as a matter of law”). 
177. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.03(c) (AM. LAW INST. 2006); RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 410, 416, 427 (AM. LAW INST. 1965). Like much else in the respondeat superior 
doctrine, the case law is unclear as to whether peculiar risk and inherently dangerous activities are a 
single category or two. Compare Pusey v. Bator, 762 N.E.2d 968, 973 (Ohio 2002) (“Work is inherently 
dangerous when it creates a peculiar risk of harm to others unless special precautions are taken.”), with 
Wilson v. Good Humor Corp., 757 F.2d 1293, 1303 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (explaining that peculiar risk is a 
separate path to nondelegable duty). For this Article, the important point is that a set of nondelegable 
duties exist. 
178. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 57 (AM. 
LAW INST. 2012) (“Except as stated in [Sections detailing nondelegable duties], an actor who hires an 
independent contractor is not subject to vicarious liability . . . .”); supra note 7. 
179. 757 F.2d at 1295. 
180. See id. at 1302–03. 
181. See id. at 1303, 1305–07. This court’s holding is limited to its jurisdiction. 
182. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 410–427 (AM. LAW INST. 1965). 
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manufacturers to retailers—strictly liable for defective products.183 Most states 
adopted a similar regime in the 1960s and 1970s.184 The emergence of online 
marketplaces poses new challenges to plaintiffs. For example, for a portion of its 
sales, Amazon has successfully argued that it was not the seller because it lacked 
control, and that the seller was instead the third-party merchant that Amazon 
merely connected to the consumer.185 However, California recently bucked that 
trend by holding that Amazon was liable for an injury resulting from a third-party 
product sale.186 Regardless of where that online seller issue goes, product liability 
has constituted an overall increase in third-party liability. 
Courts have also created nondelegable duties outside of tort law. For instance, 
some insurers’ duty of good faith is nondelegable when they hire independent 
attorneys who breach that duty.187 Additionally, in the context of labor law, over 
the past couple of decades, many state courts have discarded the prior agency 
control test and instead moved toward viewing independent contractors as pre-
sumptive employees when they are providing a central service of the business.188 
That shift forced many businesses to abide by wage and benefit laws with respect 
to independent contractors whom agency law had previously removed from such 
responsibilities.189 
Judicially created nondelegable duties and other enhancements of third-party 
liability are, however, uncommon—particularly after the Supreme Court limited 
judges’ ability to read them into federal statutes.190 When Congress has spoken 
on liability in a given context, the common law must defer.191 Because many 
large businesses are heavily regulated by federal statute today, those restraints 
183. Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 391 P.2d 168, 172 (Cal. 1964); Greenman v. Yuba Power 
Prods., Inc., 377 P.2d 897, 900 (Cal. 1963). 
184. Mark A. Geistfeld, A Roadmap for Autonomous Vehicles: State Tort Liability, Automobile 
Insurance, and Federal Safety Regulation, 105 CALIF. L. REV. 1611, 1632 (2017). 
185. See, e.g., Oberdorf v. Amazon.com, Inc., 936 F.3d 182, 183 (3d Cir. 2019) (vacating judgment 
and granting Amazon’s petition for a rehearing after previously holding that Amazon is a seller); Fox v. 
Amazon.com, Inc., 930 F.3d 415, 421, 425 (6th Cir. 2019) (affirming dismissal of products liability 
claim against Amazon after a hoverboard purchased on Amazon’s webpage burned down a house). For 
further analysis, see Christoph Busch, When Product Liability Meets the Platform Economy: A 
European Perspective on Oberdorf v. Amazon, 8 J. EUR. CONSUMER MKT. L. 173 (2019) (comparing the 
Third Circuit’s analysis of platform liability in Oberdorf to European Union rules on product liability). 
186. Bolger v. Amazon.com, LLC, No. D075738, 2020 WL 4692387, at *20 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 13, 
2020). 
187. See, e.g., Majorowicz v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 569 N.W.2d 472, 477 (Wis. Ct. App. 1997). 
188. See, e.g., Dynamex Operations W., Inc. v. Superior Court, 416 P.3d 1, 35 (Cal. 2018) 
(designating a new test that presumes a worker who performs services for a hirer is an employee for 
purposes of claims for wages and benefits); see also Anna Deknatel & Lauren Hoff-Downing, ABC on 
the Books and in the Courts: An Analysis of Recent Independent Contractor and Misclassification 
Statutes, 18 U. PA. J.L. & SOC. CHANGE 53, 65–66 (2015) (documenting states’ movement to a 
“simplified version” of the prior agency control test). 
189. See Deknatel & Hoff-Downing, supra note 188, at 71. 
190. See supra Section I.B. 
191. See, e.g., CSX Transp., Inc. v. McBride, 564 U.S. 685, 696 (2011) (finding that the Federal 
Employers’ Liability Act’s “in whole or in part” formulation precluded application of common law 
proximate cause tests in suits over railroad employee injuries suffered on the job). 
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mean that courts in many contexts cannot add to the list of nondelegable duties.192 
Courts thus have more limited opportunities to create third-party liability than do 
administrative agencies and legislators. 
2. Administrative Agency and Statutory Developments 
Statutes and regulations have provided perhaps the most significant advances 
in third-party liability, especially at the federal level. When the text of the legisla-
tion is silent, in a particularized application of Chevron deference,193 courts defer 
to regulators’ reasonable interpretations on what third-party liability to apply.194 
Moreover, prosecutors and regulators have tremendous informal enforcement 
authority over firms, which allows them to pressure businesses into settlements to 
pay for the acts of third parties even without a clear legal mandate.195 Authorities 
have thereby expanded nondelegable duties, or otherwise imposed third-party 
liability that goes beyond the common law. Examples follow from pharmaceuti-
cals, technology, oil, and finance—the sectors in which the largest U.S. compa-
nies operated as of writing.196 
The primary regulator of pharmaceutical companies, the FDA, formally articu-
lates what is increasingly a common view among regulators. Drug companies regu-
larly hire external labs to conduct tests or source their materials from third parties. 
Through rulemaking, the FDA has clarified that it “regards extramural facilities as 
an extension of the manufacturer’s own facility.”197 In other words, pharmaceutical 
companies cannot escape liability by outsourcing to third parties—they have a non-
delegable duty. 
In the tech sector, third parties are more removed than in the pharmaceutical 
sector, in that platforms arguably do not hire app developers and instead allow 
them to participate on their platforms. Yet the tech sector’s primary regulator, the 
FTC, has initiated consumer protection suits against Amazon and Google for 
third-party app developers’ charges that allowed children to incur sometimes 
thousands of dollars in fees for making quick purchases in the middle of video 
games.198 The agency also pursued Google and other companies for insufficient 
oversight of third-parties’ privacy practices.199 Although tech companies face a 
weaker form of nondelegable duty than in the other industries discussed here, at 
192. Cf. Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REV. 405, 409 
(1989) (referencing “the sheer volume of federal statutes and regulations”). 
193. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843–44 (1984). 
194. See, e.g., Henderson v. United Student Aid Funds, Inc., 918 F.3d 1068, 1072 (9th Cir. 2019) 
(deferring to the Federal Communication Commission’s interpretation in applying the TCPA). 
195. See Sean J. Griffith, Corporate Governance in an Era of Compliance, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
2075, 2119–20 (2016) (questioning the legal foundations for prosecutors’ imposition of compliance 
departments); Van Loo, supra note 148, at 412–19 (documenting regulators’ ability to pressure firms by 
ramping up enforcement and costly regulatory monitoring, such as inspections and record examination). 
196. See Fortune 500, supra note 142. 
197. 21 C.F.R. § 200.10(b) (2019). 
198. See Van Loo, supra note 23, at 469. 
199. Id. at 482. 
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least in some contexts they cannot delegate privacy and consumer protection 
responsibilities to independent third parties without incurring legal liability.200 
For large oil companies, there is sometimes a gap between liability in practice 
and liability in the law. In 1989, the Exxon Valdez oil tanker crashed off the coast 
of Alaska, spilling eleven million barrels of oil.201 The ship was owned and oper-
ated by a subsidiary of Exxon, and thus Exxon likely could have escaped liability 
under a literal application of the law.202 However, government pressure and con-
cerns about reputation forced Exxon to pay for much of the damage caused by the 
spill.203 The Justice Department indicted Exxon on five criminal charges, which 
served as a bargaining chip in the larger settlement negotiations,204 and high-level 
government officials, including the President, Vice President, and Secretary of 
Transportation, became involved.205 
After the Exxon Valdez spill, Congress expanded the liability of oil companies 
for the actions of their subsidiaries—already a strengthening of third-party 
liability—but the legislation omitted independent contractor liability.206 That sug-
gested firms might still avoid liability by outsourcing to independent contractors, 
and there is evidence that some did.207 However, the incident may have also sig-
naled that oil companies could not rely on what the law said to predict liability. 
Indeed, the larger industry move at the time seems to have been for oil companies 
to bring such transportation activities in-house.208 
The catastrophic Deepwater Horizon oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico offers a 
more complex picture of liability because the main owner of the well, BP Oil, 
was one of three main independent parties found to have been at fault in both at 
trial and in a final federal report.209 
In re Oil Spill by Oil Rig “Deepwater Horizon,” 21 F. Supp. 3d 657, 747 (E.D. La. 2014) 
(finding that BP was reckless and allocating 67% of the liability to it for the blowout); NAT’L COMM’N 
ON THE BP DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL & OFFSHORE DRILLING, DEEP WATER: THE GULF OIL 
DISASTER AND THE FUTURE OF OFFSHORE DRILLING—REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT 90 (2011), https:// 
www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GPO-OILCOMMISSION/pdf/GPO-OILCOMMISSION.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/4C7P-EUPY]. 
The contractor, Transocean, owned and ran 
the oil rig that did the drilling, and made some of the most significant direct  
200. For example, notification to consumers may limit liability considerably. 
201. See Gabison, supra note 97, at 223 & n.7. 
202. See Mendelson, supra note 15, at 1243 (“Had Exxon claimed limited liability . . . the subsidiary 
could not possibly have paid the cleanup costs.”). 
203. See id. (mentioning reputational concerns); Exxon to Renew Alaska Cleanup; Accord Ends 
Standoff with State, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 1990, at A1 (discussing intense pressure on Exxon from state 
and federal officials). 
204. See John H. Cushman Jr., Justice Officials See Exxon Trial as Risk for U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1, 
1990, at A1. 
205. DEP’T OF TRANSP., U.S. COAST GUARD, DOT-SRP-94-01, FEDERAL ON SCENE COORDINATOR’S 
REPORT T/V EXXON VALDEZ OIL SPILL 84 (1993). 
206. See Oil Pollution Act of 1990 § 1002, 33 U.S.C. § 2702 (2018). 
207. See Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 9, at 944 n.238 (“[A]fter the Exxon Valdez oil spill, Shell 
shifted some responsibility for the transport of oil from its own tanker fleet to vessels owned by 
independent contractors.”). 
208. See Brooks, supra note 6, at 110. 
209. 
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mistakes that caused the spill.210 The disaster started in unstable cement laid by 
another contractor, Halliburton, which likely could have prevented the problem if 
it had properly tested the cement before laying it on the ocean floor.211 However, 
given the many different causes and multiple parties involved, “sorting out the re-
spective responsibility for the accident would be an impossible task.”212 
Ultimately, the Environmental Protection Agency secured about $19 billion in 
settlement from BP, compared to $1.4 billion from Transocean.213 
Deepwater Horizon—BP Gulf of Mexico Oil Spill, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/enforcement/ 
deepwater-horizon-bp-gulf-mexico-oil-spill [https://perma.cc/UEL5-QMLP] (last visited Aug. 20, 
2020). BP’s total amount paid out as a consequence of the spill was over $60 billion. See Yong Gyo Lee, 
Xavier Garza-Gomez & Rose M. Lee, Ultimate Costs of the Disaster: Seven Years After the Deepwater 
Horizon Oil Spill, 29 J. CORP. ACCT. & FIN. 69, 75–78 (2018). 
It is difficult to 
know how much perception, including public pressure from President Obama on 
BP, contributed to these results,214 
President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President to the Nation on the BP Oil Spill (June 15, 
2010, 8:01 PM) (transcript available at https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/remarks- 
president-nation-bp-oil-spill [https://perma.cc/SGB7-WXQU]. 
and the underlying liability laws are numerous 
and complex. Regardless, the intent of some of the key statutes215 and result of 
their regulatory enforcement has been to push the companies earning the most 
profit toward liability even when independent contractors are making key 
mistakes. 
Financial regulators exercise perhaps the most explicitly extensive third-party 
oversight. The CFPB, the Federal Reserve, the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation, and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency all have mandates 
enabling them to sue third-party service providers that serve banks.216 Instead, 
however, regulators have pursued major financial institutions themselves. The 
CFPB has successfully brought enforcement actions against each of the four larg-
est banks—Bank of America, Citibank, JP Morgan Chase, and Wells Fargo— 
among others, for the acts of service providers.217 
That regulatory strategy begins with holding financial institutions responsible 
for making a good decision about which independent contractor to select. 
Following prosecution by financial regulators, courts have required banks to 
research third-party provider “qualifications, expertise, capacity, reputation, com-
plaints, information security, document custody practices, business continuity, 
and financial viability.”218 In the wake of such an order, the failure to vet contrac-
tors thoroughly at the outset, as well as on an ongoing basis, would violate the 
law. 
210. See id. at 92–93, 119, 124. 
211. See id. at 94–99, 115–18 (explaining also how BP made critical errors). 
212. W. Kip Viscusi & Richard J. Zeckhauser, Deterring and Compensating Oil-Spill Catastrophes: 
The Need for Strict and Two-Tier Liability, 64 VAND. L. REV. 1717, 1746 (2011); see id. at 1742 (noting 
also that the parties can shift some liability contractually). 
213. 
214. 
215. See infra note 297 and accompanying text. 
216. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 1867(c), 5514(e) (2018). 
217. Van Loo, supra note 23, at 485 (reviewing legal actions). 
218. See HSBC Bank USA, N.A., No. AA-EC-11-14, at 11 (Dep’t of Treasury, Office of the 
Comptroller of the Currency Apr. 13, 2011) (consent order). 
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In contrast, under the common law, courts rarely hold companies liable for 
negligent hiring of independent contractors.219 In one case, the court refused to 
impose liability on a company whose independent contractor transported hot 
asphalt but had no insurance and a suspended license—even though the company 
did not check such documentation beforehand.220 The driver ran a red light, 
crashed into a telephone pole, and dumped the asphalt onto another car, severely 
burning the victim.221 Regulators thus have stepped in to impose liability for non-
delegable duties in ways that courts have been historically reluctant or unable 
to do. 
The federal regulatory growth of third-party liability is not confined to the 
pharmaceutical, technology, oil, and finance industries. In labor law, for instance, 
when an agricultural company uses a third-party service to provide the labor to 
harvest crops, the agricultural company is statutorily liable for the third party’s 
violations of wage laws.222 State legislatures have codified courts’ characteriza-
tion of independent contractors as presumptive employees when the contractors 
provide a central service to the business.223 In addition, federal regulations hold 
trucking companies liable for accidents caused by drivers who are independent 
contractors.224 Nondelegable duties, or liability standards that are considerably 
easier to satisfy than the common law agency test for control, thus govern many 
industries’ third-party contractors and many different areas of law. 
Nondelegable duties have not yet reached every industry and area of law. The 
U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), for example, 
enforces the Fair Housing Act.225 
Fair Housing Enforcement Activity, U.S. DEP’T HOUSING & URB. DEV., https://www.hud.gov/ 
program_offices/fair_housing_equal_opp/enforcement [https://perma.cc/QDK6-FB3V] (last visited 
Aug. 20, 2020). 
The HUD wrote a rule allowing vicarious liabil-
ity for discrimination but made that liability “consistent with agency law.”226 Put 
differently, some regulators use their discretion to adhere more closely to the 
Supreme Court’s default of lesser third-party liability.227 Nonetheless, the expan-
sion of nondelegable duties and related liability would be significant even if 
occurring only in the industries in which the largest U.S. companies operate, 
given the economic scale and broad number of businesses involved in finance, 
technology, oil, and pharmaceuticals. Its presence in these industries and many 
219. Gabison, supra note 97, at 240. 
220. See Mavrikidis v. Petullo, 707 A.2d 977, 982–83, 986, 989 (N.J. 1998). 
221. Id. at 980. 
222. See, e.g., Rogers, supra note 53, at 5 n.7, 12 (summarizing the doctrine on third-party liability 
for wage theft). 
223. See, e.g., 2019 Cal. Legis. Serv. Ch. 296 (West) (codified at CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 2750.3, 3351 
(West 2020) and CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE §§ 606.5, 621 (West 2020)); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 149, 
§ 148B(a)(1)–(3) (West 2020); supra notes 188–89. 
224. See 49 C.F.R. § 390.5 (2019) (defining employee as “including an independent contractor while 
in the course of operating a commercial motor vehicle”). 
225. 
226. 24 C.F.R. § 100.7(b) (2019). 
227. See supra Section I.B. 
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others means that despite great variation, third-party liability has expanded well 
beyond common law respondeat superior’s reach. 
In summary, the new gatekeeper governance paradigm is propelling some 
businesses into higher control relationships, thereby making it more likely courts 
will see them as principals under the common law. Technological changes further 
strengthen that case for agency by making it more practical for companies to 
monitor wrongdoing, stay in constant communication, and punish wrongdoing 
through platform expulsion. Numerous nondelegable duties have also appeared. 
These might be better seen as a new form of gatekeeper liability because they 
often seek to promote one party’s legal compliance by making another 
responsible.228 
More study of the revival of respondeat superior and gatekeeper liability is 
needed to determine the extent of their prevalence. Certainly, courts and legisla-
tures have in recent decades sometimes made moves in the opposite direction by 
insulating businesses from third-party liability.229 
Overall, however, a closer look at laws, markets, and organizations calls into 
question the demise of respondeat superior and companies’ supposed ability to 
insulate themselves from third-party liability. Legal observers should revise their 
common assertion that a firm is not liable for the acts of independent businesses 
“absent special circumstances.”230 In light of a statutorily growing list of nondele-
gable duties, coupled with technologies and regulators moving firms toward 
agency, large businesses today have far fewer opportunities to shield themselves 
from liability by outsourcing to third parties. 
III. IMPLICATIONS 
As judges decide cases, lawmakers pass legislation, and administrative agen-
cies regulate, they all should understand the implications of promoting a new era 
of expanded third-party liability. The purpose of the expansion should not be to 
punish large size. Instead, the legal architecture should make firms internalize the 
full costs of their operations in a manner that advances efficiency while balancing 
other values, such as distribution. Policymakers will face difficulties analyzing 
those implications because firms might organizationally respond to greater liabil-
ity by insourcing or more tightly controlling their counterparties—moves that 
could undermine competition and innovation. Despite the challenge of weighing 
these various considerations, legal authorities, at a minimum, can increase liabil-
ity by adopting more sophisticated tools for measuring a firm’s power over the 
web of businesses that directly or indirectly bring it profit. 
228. See infra Section III.C (discussing gatekeeper liability in greater depth). 
229. See supra Part I. 
230. See supra note 7 and accompanying text (providing examples of this commonly repeated 
observation). 
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A. RESTRUCTURING ORGANIZATIONS 
In designing business liability law, it is essential to adjust for how the firm will 
respond to new laws. Lawyers have traditionally advised corporate clients to 
structure their organizations to avoid liability.231 In an era of robust third-party 
liability—which assumes that the penalties imposed by liability are sufficiently 
high—some companies may seek to limit liability through two main institutional 
design shifts, both of which may be pursued simultaneously. The first is for busi-
nesses to bring more activities in-house rather than outsource, thereby contribut-
ing to even larger organizations. The second and related option would be the 
business more tightly controlling its counterparties. In the extreme, it may rigidly 
limit which parties can interface in its business ecosystem, facilitated perhaps 
through greater reliance on technological platforms. 
1. Expanding Large Firms 
Scholars have documented some historical outsourcing by firms as an attempt to 
escape liability—sometimes referred to as disaggregation or disintegration.232 This 
Article has shown how the law has, for purposes of liability, essentially reintegrated 
many enterprises. It is also possible that the enterprises themselves will choose to 
organizationally reintegrate in response to those legal shifts. More broadly, the 
resurgence of third-party liability may alter the outsourcing decision—and thus the 
size and efficiency of firms. 
There are no doubt still good reasons to outsource, such as benefits related to 
costs, specialization, and nimbleness.233 Those advantages could outweigh the 
pressures that a resurgent liability regime would place on companies to insource. 
But for many current business relationships between large companies and third 
parties, liability is no longer a reason to outsource and may instead provide signif-
icant motivation to reintegrate. According to some scholars, “strong empirical 
evidence indicates that increasing exposure to tort liability has led to the wide-
spread reorganization of business firms to exploit limited liability to evade 
damage claims.”234 Despite difficulties in knowing the magnitude of such reor-
ganizations in the past,235 whatever portion of outsourcing is currently motivated 
by avoiding liability could be a target for future insourcing under an expanded 
third-party liability. 
Indeed, even outsourcing motivated solely by other considerations—such as 
efficiency—could be moved in-house if the liability regime makes it sufficiently 
231. See, e.g., Menell, supra note 75, at 401 (“[T]he role of the corporate lawyer, as a specialist in 
structuring corporations to insulate clients from serious potential liabilities, has remained much the 
same.”). 
232. See Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 18, at 1913–14; supra note 10 and accompanying text. 
233. See, e.g., Geis, supra note 53 (noting rising outsourcing and causes). 
234. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 18, at 1881. 
235. See George S. Geis, Business Outsourcing and the Agency Cost Problem, 82 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 955, 999–1000 (2007) (noting the lack of quantitative data to support how falling interaction costs 
have led to an increase in monitoring activity); see also Geis, supra note 53 (providing many possible 
reasons linked to outsourcing). 
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expensive to monitor, enforce, and pay for harms caused by third parties. In other 
words, the incentives in a world of robust vicarious liability should move compa-
nies more towards relying on third parties only when the business reasons for 
doing so are not outweighed by any increased liability-related costs. The magni-
tude of increased liability costs will be determined not only by the legal penalties, 
but also by the costs and effectiveness of monitoring.236 
Ideally, the result would be firms competing to reduce harms more efficiently. 
However, trust and a reliable estimate of third-party compliance will often be dif-
ficult to obtain without intense monitoring. Many of the most desirable smaller 
third-party contractors are essentially judgment-proof—perhaps because they are 
thinly capitalized or located abroad.237 Their ability to avoid paying for legal vio-
lations means they are more likely to have insufficient incentives themselves to 
take precautions.238 Contract law, through indemnity clauses, could help in some 
limited contexts but does not provide a comprehensive solution.239 To the extent 
that regulators or prosecutors are more willing to impose liability on the large 
company that hired the third party, expansive third-party liability could further 
lower those incentives. Firms may not want to take the risk of waiting and seeing 
which third parties are taking adequate precautions. There is some limited evi-
dence that firms have in the past responded to the threat of heightened third-party 
liability by taking third-party services in-house.240 
The revival of liability may also speak to past organizational arrangements 
that have puzzled legal scholars. Despite economic theory suggesting that they 
should vertically disintegrate, some industries have persisted in their vertical 
integration—particularly those steeped in intellectual property and intensive 
knowledge production, such as pharmaceuticals and information technol-
ogy.241 More expansive third-party liability could also contribute to surpris-
ingly enduring vertical integration. 
Moving forward, to fully assess the efficiency and social implications, policy-
makers should examine how a reinvigorated third-party liability may contribute 
236. A third party that is worse than the primary company at compliance could still be profitable to 
have as a contractual counterparty if it added more value than it lost in worsened compliance. However, 
in that instance, the third party would have incentives to improve its compliance to avoid losing the 
primary company’s business—and the primary company would still have an incentive to monitor that 
company’s compliance. 
237. See, e.g., Arlen & MacLeod, supra note 6, at 126. 
238. See id. 
239. Regulators sometimes do not allow the firm to recoup its losses from the third-party contractor. 
See supra Section II.B.2. Additionally, risk-spreading considerations would often weigh against such 
provisions when the third party is smaller because the larger firm is better able to spread costs. 
Furthermore, indemnification does not help for third parties whose judgment-proof status motivated the 
outsourcing. 
240. See, e.g., Brooks, supra note 6, at 109–10, 111 fig.1 (finding a “sharp increase” in the 
percentage of oil carried by oil companies following the Exxon Valdez oil spill). 
241. See Peter Lee, Innovation and the Firm: A New Synthesis, 70 STAN. L. REV. 1431, 1442–44 
(2018) (reviewing the literature and attributing the outsourcing resistance to knowledge aggregation 
challenges). 
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to larger enterprises that avoid outsourcing.242 Given the scale of outsourcing in 
the economy, the implications of even a partial shift would be significant. 
2. Building Walled Gardens and Platforms 
Increased third-party liability could also drive many big businesses to restrict 
their remaining third parties more closely, particularly because big businesses 
increasingly have the technological means to monitor in a cost-effective man-
ner.243 Large companies’ incentives to police third parties more closely impli-
cates a fundamental design decision that many firms already face regarding the 
level of access to allow third parties, symbolized by a choice between walled and 
open gardens. Moreover, some technological means of control—such as those 
imbedded in platform code—may become more appealing if the law fails to keep 
up. 
At one extreme, the “walled garden” model is especially associated with 
Apple’s central authority and limited third-party participation, rather than the 
more open platforms of Google’s Android and Microsoft’s PC.244 A walled gar-
den is characterized as “a system where an entity controls as many aspects of a 
product as possible and where features are only available if approved by a central 
authority.”245 That model reflects the historical business norm. For instance, tele-
communications carriers and broadcast companies have closely limited third par-
ties’ ability to contribute content and otherwise build systems.246 The original 
Apple handheld devices allowed users little ability to access source code and oth-
erwise engineer or tailor the product.247 
Walled gardens contrast with the open-platform model that gained prominence 
with the advent of computing and the Internet.248 Two examples of more broadly 
open platforms include Wikipedia, which allows users to edit content, and early 
desktop computers, which let operators more easily program the underlying 
code.249 
These options should be seen as lying on a fluid spectrum rather than as a bi-
nary and fixed choice. Companies can move toward convergence while still 
retaining dimensions of the divergent archetypes. Google made its Android  
242. These implications are discussed further infra Section III.A.3. 
243. Stated otherwise, the agency costs of outsourcing may increase if large companies are 
responsible for the acts of third parties who have diminished incentives to comply with the law. On 
agency costs in outsourcing, and firms’ increasing ability to monitor contributing to outsourcing, see 
Geis, supra note 235, at 962. 
244. See JONATHAN L. ZITTRAIN, THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNET—AND HOW TO STOP IT 1–4, 29 
(2008) (describing Apple’s tight control over the functionality of its first iPhone model as a break from 
the “PC revolution” that encouraged innovation by others). 
245. Michael H. Wolk, The iPhone Jailbreaking Exemption and the Issue of Openness, 19 CORNELL 
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 795, 797 (2010). 
246. See ZITTRAIN, supra note 244, at 181 (describing cable companies as walled gardens). 
247. See id. at 2–4. 
248. See id. at 3. 
249. See id. at 127–48 (providing a case study of Wikipedia’s openness). 
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source code open, although it has created walled gardens elsewhere.250 Apple at 
one point opened its ecosystem by developing its App Store,251 but the company 
still supervises the interactions between users and app developers more closely 
than Google does.252 
Additionally, the vertical integration decision can dovetail with that of walled 
gardens. Whereas Apple manufactures all of its phones, Google long operated 
only through phones made by others, such as Nokia, Motorola, and Samsung.253 
Businesses will weigh many factors in choosing how extensively to wall off. 
Open platforms will retain some appeal due to competitive advantages from hav-
ing a broader field of collaborators and perhaps additional revenues from winning 
over consumers who prefer open platforms.254 There are also independent reasons 
to choose walled gardens, including the protection of intellectual property and en-
closure of data and predictive algorithms.255 But a resurgent third-party liability 
may encourage more platforms to move toward walled gardens because a “bottle-
neck” central authority inherently allows for greater policing of third parties.256 
By contrast, the prior era of frail respondeat superior provided greater incentives 
to opt for an open system, which allowed third parties to operate more 
independently. 
Another outcome is possible that may free the firm from compromising by ei-
ther insourcing or building walled gardens. The platform business model may 
offer a strategy for circumventing liability when the law allows. Platforms offer a 
shield due to statutory intermediary liability protections afforded in some con-
texts, such as against defamation lawsuits, and can confound previously estab-
lished third-party liability, such as Amazon’s early avoidance of product 
liability.257 
More broadly, it is unclear that courts and lawmakers have recognized the 
extent to which computer code, big data, and the design of technical interfaces 
may constitute more subtle forms of control.258 If the law fails to adapt to these  
250. J. Gregory Sidak, Do Free Mobile Apps Harm Consumers?, 52 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 619, 621 
(2015); Stucke & Ezrachi, supra note 127, at 1291. 
251. James Grimmelmann & Paul Ohm, Dr. Generative or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and 
Love the iPhone, 69 MD. L. REV. 910, 920–24 (2010) (book review). 
252. See Richard N. Langlois, Design, Institutions, and the Evolution of Platforms, 9 J.L. ECON. & 
POL’Y 1, 12 (2012). 
253. The company recently began to manufacture its own phones. See id. at 9, 12. Apple still would 
use third-party contractors in the manufacture. 
254. See id. at 13; see also Salil K. Mehra, Paradise Is a Walled Garden? Trust, Antitrust, and User 
Dynamism, 18 GEO. MASON L. REV. 889, 894 (2011) (discussing user-generated innovation). If a 
company believed that appealing to the do-it-yourself crowd would improve revenues overall, it might 
opt for an open-source model with higher liability. 
255. See, e.g., Langlois, supra note 252, at 13; Mehra, supra note 254, at 920. 
256. The model is, after all, built on control. See supra notes 244–46 and accompanying text. 
257. See supra notes 13, 126 and accompanying text. 
258. On the law’s failure to keep up with platformization, see Julie E. Cohen, Law for the Platform 
Economy, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 133, 177–87 (2017). 
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developments—fails either to grasp how they work or to scrutinize them259— 
businesses would have an option, based in agency law, for evading third-party 
liability. Stated otherwise, the law’s failure to keep up could offer companies 
technological means to avoid liability while retaining control of third parties. 
3. Implications of Strategic Reorganization 
The discussion so far has focused on outlining potential strategic responses by 
businesses. Identifying the implications and risks of those hypothetical responses 
is also an integral part of navigating the path forward. 
Compared to open platforms, walled gardens rely more on “secrecy and obfus-
cation.”260 When companies close off their networks, innovation may suffer.261 
Closed systems can also limit opportunities for competitors and entrepreneurs to 
participate, and in the extreme, they can facilitate monopoly power.262 Concerns 
about openness have prompted a number of scholars to propose regulations that 
would allow for more broad-based participation, including mandating network 
architecture,263 an open Internet,264 and creativity-conducive Internet design 
principles.265 
The issue is further complicated because walled gardens, along with the regula-
tory gatekeeper model requiring significant monitoring, are conducive to obtain-
ing valuable competitive information about the practices of those third-party 
companies.266 That information would help educate the large company on how to 
replicate those third-party services in-house. The closeness also could inform 
decisions on whether to purchase those third parties it is monitoring closely, thus 
leading to further consolidation. 
As a result, some third parties may resist close monitoring if it would risk 
revealing competitively sensitive information.267 However, that resistance could 
exacerbate the make-or-buy decision. The more the third party resists monitoring, 
the more nervous the principal may be about liability—thus further incentivizing 
insourcing. In light of these disparate levels of comfort with information sharing 
259. See generally Rory Van Loo, The Missing Regulatory State: Monitoring Businesses in an Age of 
Surveillance, 72 VAND. L. REV. 1563 (2019) (discussing challenges to monitoring technologies and 
platforms). 
260. See Jonathan L. Zittrain, The Generative Internet, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1975, 1982 (2006). 
261. See Mehra, supra note 254, at 894–96 (arguing that walled gardens can be preferable overall 
and offer great innovation). Of course, Apple’s semi-open “walled garden” appeals to many users. 
262. See, e.g., Zittrain, supra note 260. 
263. BARBARA VAN SCHEWICK, INTERNET ARCHITECTURE AND INNOVATION 387–89, 392 (2010). 
264. See Kevin Werbach, Off the Hook, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 535, 571–98 (2010). 
265. See Mark A. Lemley & Lawrence Lessig, The End of End-to-End: Preserving the Architecture 
of the Internet in the Broadband Era, 48 UCLA L. REV. 925, 928–29, 971 (2001). 
266. See Lina M. Khan, The Separation of Platforms and Commerce, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 973, 
1006–08 (2019) (analyzing Apple’s monitoring of apps that compete with comparable Apple services). 
267. The law would likely provide limited protection in the case of trade secrets accessed. See Robert 
G. Bone, A New Look at Trade Secret Law: Doctrine in Search of Justification, 86 CALIF. L. REV. 241, 
244 (1998) (noting that trade secret protection is weaker than other forms of intellectual property 
protection because it requires the breach of relationally specific duties). 
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and the great heterogeneity of business counterparties, large companies would 
likely adopt a variety of strategies. 
Overall, the smart move for many of those companies may be to more tightly 
control a smaller remaining corps of third parties and to simultaneously bring 
some portion of services in-house. In that scenario, the expansion of liability 
would drive toward greater concentration of authority in the private sector and 
away from distributed authority—analogous to the trend in the public sector to-
ward concentration strategies.268 Today’s large firms would become even larger 
and more insular. 
A move along the spectrum toward walled gardens and larger companies is not 
inevitably negative.269 However, those shifts can lead to significant harms that 
would need to be addressed by other legal mechanisms, such as antitrust law. 
Some efficiency could also be lost if firms bring in-house services that would be 
more cost-effective to handle externally. Additionally, because the walling off of 
companies is a potential consequence, it is important to recognize that demands 
for a more open Internet, and indeed an open society, may be in tension with a 
reinvigorated third-party liability.270 
Thus, if greater third-party liability pushes more firms toward larger walled 
gardens, the decreased openness and greater concentration could produce unin-
tended, harmful consequences. Policies mandating third-party platform access, 
and modernizing antitrust, may take on greater urgency. These implications are 
worthy of attention as decisionmakers consider whether and how to continue 
expanding third-party liability. 
B. WEIGHING NORMATIVE FOUNDATIONS 
The organizational incentives that push toward larger walled garden firms 
inform the broader normative question of whether and under what conditions a re-
surgent liability regime is desirable. Three potential justifications are found in ef-
ficiency, distribution, and the need for the law to keep up with change. Although 
each of these has limitations, they provide normative foundations for third-party 
liability that different parties may find persuasive. 
1. Balancing Efficiency and Distribution 
To the extent that stronger third-party liability drives insourcing, the economic 
implications could be mixed. Larger walled firms could cause inefficiencies, 
most notably if they undermine competition or cut off avenues for leveraging 
more nimble and specialized business structures. However, some have concluded 
that the weak vicarious liability regime created incentives in the past to outsource 
excessively and to take insufficient precautions to avoid harm.271 Consequently, 
268. See Univ. of Chi. Law Sch., Saul Levmore, “How Does Law Work? Concentration and 
Distribution Strategies,” YOUTUBE (Nov. 5, 2014), https://youtu.be/-xIPzgn9kq4. 
269. On the spectral nature of the choice between walled gardens and open platforms, see, for 
example, Mehra, supra note 254, at 895. 
270. For a related tension in intermediary liability, see supra note 137. 
271. See, e.g., Arlen & MacLeod, supra note 6, at 139–40. 
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some portion of large companies’ historical disaggregation may have been ineffi-
cient, if the companies could have operated the outsourced services at lower costs 
than the third parties.272 Under those assumptions, efficiency could improve as a 
result of strong liability. 
The overall costs to society of business activity also include externalities, or 
the effects that business activities have on other parties, such as causing physical 
injuries. Those costs could decline if businesses took more appropriate precau-
tions as a result of internalizing the risk of harm. A similar internalization-of- 
costs argument can be made for requiring firms to pay for the benefits of contract 
workers.273 Importantly, a stronger liability regime would improve the economy 
by more closely mapping liability to those who profit most from the economic ac-
tivity giving rise to the responsibility.274 For internalization to occur, the remedies 
would need to reflect the costs of the activity rather than simply imposing liability 
on the optimal party.275 
Finally, there are potential efficiency gains in relying on a large business, 
rather than the government, to regulate smaller businesses.276 Because the large 
business is already in the industry and in touch with its smaller contractors, it can 
presumably monitor and enforce in a more cost-effective manner, compared to 
paying for a government entity to re-create the information transfer and sophisti-
cation. Of course, there are countervailing concerns about accountability and 
industry capture of a privatized regulatory process—although it is not clear that 
government regulation would offer an improvement.277 Some of these issues are 
taken up below, but for now, the main point is that there is a theoretical basis for 
concluding that the growth in third-party liability would significantly increase ef-
ficiency by undoing some previously inefficient outsourcing, removing external-
ities, and lowering the costs of regulation.278 Assuming those observations are 
accurate, the overall costs to society of offering a good or service could decrease 
due to stronger third-party liability. 
272. See id.; see also Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 18, at 1914–15 (describing two examples 
where a disaggregation strategy would result in inefficiencies through lost economies of scale or scope). 
Outsourcing to inefficient third parties could still make economic sense for the primary firm because the 
savings in liability exceed the losses in third-party inefficiency. See id. 
273. See Michael C. Harper, Using the Anglo-American Respondeat Superior Principle to Assign 
Responsibility for Worker Statutory Benefits and Protections, 18 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 161, 
165–66 (2019) (arguing for cost internalization in the context of digital platform labor). On efficiency 
and labor law more broadly, see generally Keith N. Hylton, Efficiency and Labor Law, 87 NW. U. L. 
REV. 471 (1993). 
274. See supra note 40 and accompanying text (tying respondeat superior liability to profits). But see 
generally A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, The Uneasy Case for Product Liability, 123 HARV. L. 
REV. 1437 (2010) (raising issues with product liability). 
275. Cf. Gregory C. Keating, The Idea of Fairness in the Law of Enterprise Liability, 95 MICH. L. 
REV. 1266, 1267, 1359 (1997) (describing enterprise liability as imposing “responsibility on injurers 
commensurate with their power” based on profits). 
276. Van Loo, supra note 23, at 512. 
277. Id. 
278. See Arlen & MacLeod, supra note 6, at 139–40. 
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A reinvigorated third-party liability also may bring progressive distributional 
effects. Consumers harmed by discrimination, deception, privacy invasions, and 
other violations likely have an overall lower income than owners and executives 
of large companies.279 Yet a weak liability regime could subject many individuals 
to uncompensated harms. Requiring employers to pay for contract workers’ bene-
fits may also lower inequality.280 
However, it is possible that greater liability overall would increase the costs of 
doing business in some industries. Businesses could pass those increased costs on 
to consumers and possibly workers. Thus, the distributional effects would be mul-
tidirectional. Nonetheless, the most straightforward change would be to shift 
more of the costs of doing business from uncompensated individuals and small 
businesses to large companies.281 Stronger liability could thereby play a role in 
reducing economic inequality. 
Although the full efficiency and distributional implications are impossible to 
predict with any great accuracy, it is noteworthy that often policymakers must 
decide which of two important goals to advance—efficiency or equality—at the 
expense of the other.282 In theory, stronger third-party liability can increase both. 
2. Administering Justice and Adapting the Law 
Some harms involved in liability, such as environmental degradation or sys-
temic risk, fit less readily into distributional and efficiency analyses. Whatever 
the normative foundations for the underlying laws of financial regulation, antidis-
crimination, consumer protection, and other areas, there is a need for liability to 
keep up with a changing world. These non-quantifiable considerations point to 
the value of improving the administration of justice. 
Judges have repeatedly shown an inclination to expand third-party liability to 
reach independent contractors and subsidiaries.283 Although economic considera-
tions can justify that expansion, some courts have implied that they have addi-
tional motivations. They have made known their distaste for businesses that 
strategically delegate responsibilities to third parties to evade liability—what one 
judge described as “mere subterfuge” and another as “ostrich-like” behavior.284 
279. This statement can be inferred because consumer spending is more spread among the population 
than ownership of large companies, which is highly concentrated in wealthy households even after 
adjusting for stock ownership. See, e.g., Einer Elhauge, Horizontal Shareholding, 129 HARV. L. REV. 
1267, 1293–95 (2016) (noting that many economists believe that anticompetitively higher prices 
contribute to economic inequality). 
280. Cf. Harper, supra note 273, at 190–94 (making a case, out of economic fairness, for 
strengthening respondeat superior in the context of digital platform labor). 
281. On the tradeoff between consumers and firms, see Rory Van Loo, Broadening Consumer Law: 
Competition, Protection, and Distribution, 95 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 211, 235 (2019). 
282. See Zachary Liscow, Is Efficiency Biased?, 85 U. CHI. L. REV. 1649, 1650–51 (2018); Zachary 
D. Liscow, The Efficiency of Equity in Local Government Finance, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1828, 1879–80 
(2017) (describing the typical tradeoff and demonstrating efficiency grounds for equitable policies). 
283. See supra Part I. 
284. Ga. Truck Sys., Inc. v. Interstate Commerce Comm’n, 123 F.2d 210, 212 (5th Cir. 1941) 
(referring to interstate motor carriers’ avoidance of liability); FTC v. Lifewatch Inc., 176 F. Supp. 3d 
757, 773 (N.D. Ill. 2016). 
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Another way of viewing the expansion is thus simply as ensuring that the laws 
reach the activities they were originally intended to reach without becoming ob-
solete due to either organizational or technological change. 
The judicial rejection of a respondeat superior test that focused on who paid 
for the service—and adoption of an agency law test—may have made sense at a 
time when individuals and small businesses dominated commerce and when mid-
dle-class consumers would have had a hard time policing the growing array of in-
dependent contractors.285 Additionally, the technologies did not exist then for 
cost-effective monitoring. In the 1800s, independent contractors such as mechan-
ics were therefore more reasonable parties to hold solely liable. Even when giant 
monopolies began to populate the twentieth-century economy, respondeat supe-
rior still often forced them to internalize more of the costs of their businesses 
because they handled more of their services internally through their own employ-
ees.286 For these reasons, the traditional respondeat superior regime fit better with 
the organizational landscapes in the pre-industrial and industrial eras. 
In contrast, a liability regime that reaches only employees makes less sense in 
the modern context of technologically advanced companies hiring significantly 
smaller contractors. It is impractical to sue or regulate many of these smaller con-
tractors, specifically those chosen to avoid liability. Today’s largest companies 
are often in a position either to complete the third party’s work in-house or to con-
trol the contractors they hire.287 They do not need the protections from liability 
that nineteenth-century middle-class consumers and smaller businesses may have 
needed upon hiring mechanics. Additionally, because large companies have more 
customers than a small third-party contractor, they may ultimately be better posi-
tioned to spread the costs—allowing the allocation of liability to serve as a kind 
of insurance.288 
Furthermore, the modern economy exhibits several structural features that 
complicate the analysis of business relationships. Businesses operate on a modu-
lar service model, often hiring part-time independent contractors who may them-
selves hire independent contractors.289 The companies WeWork, Upwork, and 
TaskRabbit, for instance, provide on-demand services such as office space and  
285. See Carlson, supra note 41, at 304. Moreover, even under a stringent respondeat superior regime, 
the harmed party could always sue the independent contractor directly rather than going after the company 
that hired it. Thus, centuries ago, when the hiring business did not dwarf service providers to the same 
extent as today, and when most independent contractors were domestic, respondeat superior did not 
necessarily shield a significantly more sophisticated or deep-pocketed defendant. See supra Part I. 
286. See supra notes 51–52 and accompanying text. 
287. On the ease of control, see supra Section II.A. 
288. Cf. Partnoy, supra note 95, at 492, 542–46 (conceptualizing securities gatekeeper liability as 
insurance). But see Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 274, at 1441 (arguing that products liability forces 
people to pay for insurance they may not want). 
289. See Blair et al., supra note 5; see also Matthew T. Bodie, Participation as a Theory of 
Employment, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 661, 723–24 (2013) (discussing trends toward temporary and 
contingent workers). 
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temporary help.290 Additionally, technology and finance have interjected layers 
of intermediation into almost every industry, including at the labor level through 
the gig economy.291 These changes in sophistication, technology, and business or-
ganization justify an update to third-party liability. 
A “chief attribute”292 of the common law is to adjust to changes in society.293 
The law should not provide rights without remedies.294 Yet allowing large busi-
nesses to manipulate corporate structures and leverage outsourcing to avoid 
liability would too often leave a harmed party without recourse to the law. 
Greater understanding of the revival of respondeat superior can help address that 
problem because, in applying the common law to changing contexts, judges often 
look to other courts and broader indicators of policy. 
In summary, there are theoretical normative foundations in efficiency and dis-
tribution for expanding liability to subsidiaries and independent contractors. The 
empirical evidence is, however, quite limited. Future studies should examine 
those factors through an expanded lens that includes how businesses might 
respond by insourcing, building walled gardens, and deploying technological 
mechanisms of control. The findings would ideally inform the necessary project 
of adapting a colonial-era doctrine to an economy driven by remote technologies 
and large corporations. 
C. MODERNIZING LIABILITY 
Regardless of whether one agrees with the normative foundations for doing so, 
policymakers and judges are frequently holding large businesses liable for the 
acts of smaller independent entities and subsidiaries. A substantial path to that 
liability lies through a flexible common law test for control developed long ago. 
More sophisticated analyses could help to sharpen the test, decrease its inconsis-
tency, and better calibrate penalties. Similar tools might be used in gatekeeper 
liability and related areas. In particular, two components would benefit from 
greater clarity in any update to third-party liability: the measurement of power 
and mapping of network influence. 
1. Measuring Power 
A focus on power is at the doctrine’s roots, in its test for control, and at the 
heart of many courts’ twentieth-century efforts to read third-party liability into 
federal statutes.295 Regulators in diverse industries have already embraced the 
290. See Inara Scott & Elizabeth Brown, Redefining and Regulating the New Sharing Economy, 19 
U. PA. J. BUS. L. 553, 561–65 (2017). 
291. See Judge, supra note 30, at 574–75, 592; Lin, supra note 30. 
292. Utermehle v. McGreal, 1 App. D.C. 359, 368 (D.C. Cir. 1893), rev’d sub nom. MacGreal v. 
Taylor, 167 U.S. 688 (1897). 
293. See, e.g., Achtenberg, supra note 37, at 2241. 
294. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 163 (1803). 
295. See supra Part I; see also Search v. Uber Techs., Inc., 128 F. Supp. 3d 222, 231 (D.D.C. 2015) 
(stating that the “power to control” is usually “the determinative factor” in the agency test for respondeat 
superior (quoting Moorehead v. District of Columbia, 747 A.2d 138, 143 (D.C. 2000))); CPC Int’l, Inc. 
v. Aerojet–Gen. Corp., 777 F. Supp. 549, 573 (W.D. Mich. 1991) (holding that “a parent corporation is 
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idea of holding the largest companies liable.296 As the judge in the B.P. Oil 
Deepwater Horizon case stated, the Clean Water Act was “designed to ‘place[] a 
major part of the financial burden for achieving and maintaining clean water 
upon those who would profit by the use of our navigable waters and adjacent 
areas.’”297 
Despite the consistent emphasis on power and policing third parties, courts can 
lose sight of what is most important as they weigh many diverse factors, and “[a] 
fact found controlling in one combination may have a minor importance in 
another.”298 Accordingly, the traditional test weakens the analysis of power—or 
at least allows for less informative measures of it—by joining so many other con-
siderations in a nonhierarchical manner. 
In practice, prosecutors, plaintiffs, and regulators often have little problem 
identifying the party they should pursue: the most valuable company with signifi-
cant involvement in the harm.299 Such decisions flow from diverse psychological 
foundations, including the allure of the greater wealth and attention that comes 
from suing large companies. 
Nonetheless, the legal test for control should be—and arguably already is in 
many instances—simplified to prioritize the principal’s ability to police, as 
defined by monitoring and punishing.300 Courts would then give less weight to 
secondary considerations used in some contexts, such as whether the alleged 
agent saw or represented itself as an agent. Additionally, courts should view any 
firm’s use of extensive surveillance technologies for its workforce or independent 
contractors as strengthening the case for third-party liability because that surveil-
lance indicates monitoring ability. 
Even when courts focus on technologies, monitoring, and enforcement, those 
inquiries are bereft of many indicators that can help identify power. In particular, 
they often leave out any quantitative measures. Other regulatory analyses that 
hinge on market power, such as antitrust, tend to focus on micro-level indicators 
such as price, activity-level profits, and market share.301 
Another topic potentially worth exploring is how common ownership might factor into the 
respondeat superior reforms. On the issues raised by concentrated ownership, see Frank Partnoy, Are 
Index Funds Evil?, ATLANTIC, Sept. 2017, https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2017/09/are- 
index-funds-evil/534183. 
Courts could in respon-
deat superior analyses consider such metrics because they provide some insight 
into whether a firm is truly in a position to punish a third-party contractor by ter-
minating a contract. However, the antitrust analysis does not provide an off-the- 
directly liable under [S]ection 107(a)(2) [of CERCLA] as an operator only when it has exerted power or 
influence over its subsidiary”), vacated sub nom. United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51 (1998). 
296. See supra Sections II.A.2.a, II.A.2.c. 
297. In re Oil Spill by Oil Rig “Deepwater Horizon,” 844 F. Supp. 2d 746, 759 (E.D. La. 2012) 
(alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Coastal States Crude, 643 F.2d 1125, 1128 (5th Cir. 
1981)), rev’d in part, 21 F. Supp. 3d 657 (E.D. La. 2014). The court had to read that design into the 
statute through historical research because it was not clearly stated. See id. at 759–60. 
298. Burruss v. B. M. C. Logging Co., 31 P.2d 263, 264 (N.M. 1934). 
299. For examples, see supra Part II. 
300. See supra Section II.A. 
301. 
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shelf analytic toolkit because it is resource-intense, has inherent limitations, and 
is not tailored to the kind of control analysis involved in third-party liability.302 
There are, however, more straightforward approaches that are in some ways 
more fitting to respondeat superior—rooted, as that doctrine is, in one party’s 
domination of another. Courts could inquire into how much of the alleged 
agent’s revenues come from the principal—whether from the principal’s direct 
payments or from other factors, such as access to consumers. That straightfor-
ward figure would better indicate the principal’s ability to punish than the current 
emphasis on the contractual right to terminate.303 After all, a threat to terminate a 
contract that accounts for a small percent of the contractor’s business will have 
limited leverage. 
Another measure of power—market value—is not officially part of liability 
analyses. A company’s market valuation reflects the appraisal of many sophisti-
cated investors.304 It monetizes difficult-to-quantify sources of power, such as the 
value of data, and considers the entire corporation—including, in the case of 
Alphabet, subsidiaries such as Google and YouTube.305 Moreover, valuation is 
more readily available and relatively standardized, at least for publicly traded 
companies, which are the world’s largest.306 
Establishing quantitative estimates of power is not necessary for a liability re-
gime to thrive, but focusing more explicitly on power can provide insight into 
control, potentially making a disorganized doctrine more coherent. It might also 
inform a project that is beyond the scope of the current discussion: setting the 
penalties at an optimal amount. Thus, to enrich their analyses of monitoring and 
punishment as a means of determining control, lawmakers and courts should con-
sider prioritizing the most important components of monitoring and punishment 
as indicators of control, as well as bringing quantitative metrics into the analysis. 
The aim of those metrics would be to ensure businesses internalize the full costs 
of their activities. 
2. Mapping Network Control 
Along with power, another dimension of third-party liability needing an 
upgrade is the approach to networks. More specifically, how should the doctrine 
respond to the nonlinear and indirect nature of many business relationships? 
In a heavily intermediated world, the solution does not lie in returning to 
the nineteenth-century alternate approach to respondeat superior of holding 
302. Many of the core antitrust considerations are difficult to analyze and define, making courts’ and 
juries’ tasks difficult. Rebecca Haw, Adversarial Economics in Antitrust Litigation: Losing Academic 
Consensus in the Battle of the Experts, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 1261, 1284 (2012); see also Ian Ayres & F. 
Clayton Miller, “I’ll Sell It to You at Cost”: Legal Methods to Promote Retail Markup Disclosure, 84 
NW. U. L. REV. 1047, 1078 (1990) (showing how firms may obfuscate profit levels to evade regulation). 
303. See supra Section II.A.2 (discussing courts’ emphases on contract termination). 
304. See, e.g., MICHAEL C. EHRHARDT & EUGENE F. BRIGHAM, CORPORATE FINANCE: A FOCUSED 
APPROACH 293 (6th ed. 2017). 
305. See id. 
306. See Fortune 500, supra note 142. 
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accountable the party that pays for the independent contractor. That alternative 
might sometimes work but would often not translate in a straightforward manner. 
As an initial matter, fragmentation can introduce degrees of separation and 
shroud relationships. In a fragmented economy, powerful firms are hubs with 
numerous direct ties, each of which may have many of its own contractors.307 In 
mortgages, for instance, a broker often initiates a loan, the bank provides the 
money, investment funds purchase the loan, and a non-bank mortgage servicer 
receives the homeowner’s payments.308 In these business networks, there is some-
times no single answer to the question of which party is paying whom for the core 
service. In addition, often the party paying the independent contractor is the con-
sumer on Amazon, or a smaller business may pay the large platform for access to 
consumers.309 Furthermore, payment can be in subtle forms, like a consumer’s 
attention or data.310 Focusing on direct monetary payment would thus leave out 
some indications of modern power and potentially recreate the problem— 
rejected in the 1800s—of holding unsophisticated parties liable for risks they can-
not monitor. 
Despite the extended relationships, businesses have demonstrated the ability to 
exert control over network actors who are more removed. For instance, Walmart 
and other retailers pressure manufacturers to police their foreign production 
facilities as part of supply chain management,311 aiming to use such control to 
limit risks. 
The law would ideally have a means to trace liability through the various con-
nections to the actors who can most effectively use their power and remote tech-
nologies to influence even those who are not direct counterparties. In other 
words, a network theory of liability is needed.312 Network theory can help to 
determine whether a given company has sufficient control over a business net-
work. For instance, one can estimate whether a given node is responsible for 
more than 30% of the network traffic—perhaps measured by data or payments— 
as part of a nonlinear, more holistic analysis.313 The greater the influence on the 
307. See, e.g., Blair et al., supra note 5, at 287–89. 
308. See Raymond H. Brescia, Capital in Chaos: The Subprime Mortgage Crisis and the Social 
Capital Response, 56 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 271, 289–91 (2008). 
309. See Rory Van Loo, Rise of the Digital Regulator, 66 DUKE L.J. 1267, 1275–76 (2017). 
310. John M. Newman, Antitrust in Zero-Price Markets: Foundations, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 149, 166 
(2015). 
311. See Rogers, supra note 53, at 16–17; see also Jane K. Winn, The Secession of the Successful: 
The Rise of Amazon as Private Global Consumer Protection Regulator, 58 ARIZ. L. REV. 193, 209–10 
(2016) (describing mandatory requirements and voluntary commitments by employers like Walmart to 
“maintain an acceptable minimum level of protection for workers and suppliers,” including through 
antislavery and antitrafficking efforts). 
312. Developed independently from this Article, Anat Lior has also begun to apply network theory to 
liability, but in a significantly more sustained manner. See Anat Lior, The AI Accident Network: 
Artificial Intelligence Liability Meets Network Theory, 95 TUL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2021). 
313. See, e.g., Daijun Wei, Xinyang Deng, Xiaoge Zhang, Yong Deng & Sankaran Mahadevan, 
Identifying Influential Nodes in Weighted Networks Based on Evidence Theory, 392 PHYSICA A 2564, 
2570–71 (2013) (discussing a method of statistical analysis to find influential nodes in a weighted 
network). 
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network flow, the more likely the actor can exert control over the participation of 
other parties. 
Together, these elements for measuring both power and network influence 
could be seen either as ways to retool existing doctrines or as an updated 
approach to third-party liability. These concepts build on existing ideas of respon-
deat superior, “gatekeeper liability,” and enterprise liability but go beyond 
them.314 The influential notion of gatekeeper liability is distinct in that it seeks to 
hold accountants and other peripheral actors liable for failing to catch the viola-
tions that they are supposed to prevent when they sign off on business activ-
ities.315 Gatekeeper liability is targeted at a third party, often a peripheral actor, 
and seeks to hold the watchperson liable.316 In contrast, the revival aims to hold 
the real parties with power liable—more analogous to imposing liability on the 
nobles who would have hired the old watchpersons, rather than imposing liability 
on the watchpersons themselves. Thus, something akin to respondeat gatekeeper 
has emerged, in that firms with the ability to monitor and punish must “answer” if 
they do not adequately enforce the law against third parties.317 
Neither the revival nor this Article’s proposals are based on a conception of 
large corporations’ size as inherently positive or negative. They do not view busi-
ness size as harming society any more than network theory views high-traffic 
nodes in the network as bad. Rather, from a theoretical perspective, high-traffic 
nodes may merit additional scrutiny for the health of the network—as would a 
ladder between two decks on a ship, which if improperly engineered can serve as a 
bottleneck for the flow of the crew.318 By analogy, holding businesses liable when 
they can influence conduct—by technologically enhanced monitoring and punish-
ing—improves the health of markets. Retooling third-party liability offers a poten-
tial means of building more efficient commercial networks or marketplaces, while 
314. Network keeper liability reflects many scholarly calls for “enterprise liability” at its broadest 
level of abstraction, which is “the maxim that those who profit from the imposition of risk should bear 
the costs of the accidents that are a price of their profits.” Keating, supra note 76. It is necessary to 
distinguish network liability, however, because enterprise liability has many meanings and typically 
applies to different (and narrower) contexts than this Article’s focus. For example, enterprise liability 
sometimes refers to holding all manufacturers in an industry liable for a tort when it is impossible to 
identify the actual harm-causing manufacturer. See, e.g., Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 607 P.2d 924, 928 & 
n.9 (Cal. 1980). More commonly, it refers to holding the organizationally connected web of subsidiaries 
and parents responsible as one entity, but those discussions rarely reach independent contractors. See, 
e.g., Meredith Dearborn, Comment, Enterprise Liability: Reviewing and Revitalizing Liability for 
Corporate Groups, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 195, 198–202, 252–54 (2009) (focusing on parent–subsidiary 
relationships in proposing reforms to strengthen enterprise liability); supra note 75 and accompanying 
text. Network liability thus builds on enterprise liability to expand the concept to a broader group of 
actors connected through subtle modern modes of intermediation. 
315. See Kraakman, supra note 24, at 53–54 (identifying and developing gatekeeper liability). 
316. See id. at 54 & n.3. 
317. Another way to conceive of it is as “respondeat imperium,” reflecting the Latin word for 
“power.” 
318. See Douglas Rigterink, Rebecca Piks & David J. Singer, The Use of Network Theory to Model 
Disparate Ship Design Information, 6 INT’L J. NAVAL ARCHITECTURE & OCEAN ENGINEERING 484, 489 
(2014) (applying network theory to ship passageways). 
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potentially also answering calls to hold businesses accountable for laws they have 
too often evaded. 
3. Objections 
Both the power and network elements of an updated liability regime need 
greater development than space constraints allow here. Nonetheless, several 
potential objections merit at least brief additional consideration. These objections 
apply to both the specific tools discussed above to modernize liability and to the 
idea of reinforcing respondeat gatekeeper. 
One challenge is that any quantitative test for power cannot avoid some degree 
of vagueness and debatable metrics. Thus, whatever metrics are adopted for net-
work power—market valuation, network theory, or otherwise—would have sig-
nificant limitations. With that said, the test for holding a company liable for the 
acts of an independent contractor is already an inconsistent “morass.”319 
Thus, it is important to assess new tools in comparison to the existing ones 
rather than compared to an impossible standard of absolute clarity.320 When 
viewed with the current judicial test as the reference point, a focus on the ability 
to monitor and punish wrongdoing—and factoring in quantitative measures of 
power—helps to prioritize and focus the existing factors, and thus could improve 
doctrinal and policymaking cohesion. 
Another potential objection—and one faced by any proposal for increased reg-
ulation, whether antitrust, consumer financial protection, or vicarious liability— 
is the risk of stifling investment and innovation. Other scholars’ examinations of 
increased liability, such as for “unlimited liability,” have devoted considerable 
attention to addressing these and other critiques from a theoretical perspective,321 
but innovation is difficult to measure. Fortunately, this Article’s proposals reflect 
what is already implicitly happening in some of the most lucrative industries.322 
Until data from direct studies arrive, these large parts of the economy are profita-
ble and innovative, boosting confidence that widespread application of respon-
deat gatekeeper will not halt innovation or investment.323 
Indeed, adding the proposed quantitative tests could improve innovation by 
making it more feasible for small actors to thrive. Because quantitative measures 
319. Conn, supra note 37 (“Companies do not know in what circumstances liability will attach. 
Uncertainty and inconsistency are rife and well documented.”). The doctrinal generality of vicarious 
liability allows judges to come to differing conclusions based on similar fact patterns. This “ad hoc 
approach” leads to “imponderability and unpredictability.” King, Jr., supra note 54, at 462; see also 
Richardson v. APAC–Mississippi, Inc., 631 So. 2d 143, 150 (Miss. 1994) (“[T]he various tests to 
determine the type of relationship are themselves generalities which can be viewed quite differently, 
depending upon which judge is applying them.”). 
320. See Adrian Vermeule, The Supreme Court, 2008 Term—Foreword: System Effects and the 
Constitution, 123 HARV. L. REV. 4, 17–18 (2009) (“The general theory of second best holds that where it 
is not possible to satisfy all the conditions necessary for an economic system to reach an overall 
optimum, it is not desirable to satisfy as many of those conditions as possible.”). 
321. See Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 18, at 1880, 1887, 1903–06. 
322. See supra Part II. 
323. Most notably, it is occurring in the technology sector. See supra Part II. 
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might consider valuation and industry share of profits, the test could be designed 
so that small businesses would incur lower levels of third-party liability. Startups 
would thus have a barrier to growth removed in the early phases of their business 
life cycles when it may not make sense to require them to develop a sophisticated 
third-party monitoring apparatus.324 
Proposals for greater regulation of businesses also face a practicality hurdle. 
Because the rise of respondeat gatekeeper occurred without any interdisciplinary 
push or even recognition, it is inconsistently distributed—different industries 
face varying levels of vicarious liability and judges emphasize different factors in 
the test for control.325 Also, the legal foundations lie in a patchwork of sources, 
including statutes, administrative agency rules and guidance, and court-approved 
settlements.326 Ideally, the framework for third-party liability would be updated 
through comprehensive federal legislation clarifying the agency test. That pro-
cess would enable a more systematic consideration of all of the potential implica-
tions of a revival, such as insourcing and walled gardens. A federal statute would 
also address the piecemeal manner of liability’s evolution, which currently sub-
jects companies to potentially disparate liability depending on the regulator or 
judge. Yet such legislation is unlikely. 
In the absence of legislation, an upside of the nebulous, flexible test for control 
currently applied is that judges can emphasize network liability principles today— 
by focusing on the most important factors offered by the common law—without 
going against precedent.327 For instance, the common law can extend along a chain 
of relationships if each agent had the authority to appoint the next agent in the 
chain of authority.328 Thus, unlike other proposals such as tax restructuring and 
antitrust reform to pursue efficiency and distribution goals, meaningful liability 
change could happen without any need to overturn well-established precedents or 
build consensus in gridlocked legislatures. 
CONCLUSION 
Agency law has long constricted the reach of respondeat superior through an 
exacting test for control. That test previously provided businesses with an oppor-
tunity to avoid third-party liability by relying on subsidiaries or independent 
324. Cf. Elizabeth Pollman, Startup Governance, 168 U. PA. L. REV. 155, 200 (2019) (observing that 
startups struggle to monitor internally); Elizabeth Pollman & Jordan M. Barry, Regulatory 
Entrepreneurship, 90 S. CAL. L. REV. 383, 385 (2017) (describing recent startups as “regulatory 
entrepreneurs” whose business plans include pushing for legal changes). 
325. See supra Section II.B.2 (summarizing differences in approaches across regulators); supra note 
319 and accompanying text (discussing judicial inconsistency). 
326. See supra Part II. 
327. Compare White v. Gulf Oil Corp., 406 A.2d 48, 50–52 (Del. 1979) (emphasizing that the 
various common law agency factors, including the “predominant” power to control, provide a dynamic, 
flexible tool courts may utilize to find principal–agent relationships), with U.S. EEOC v. Glob. 
Horizons, Inc., 915 F.3d 631, 640–41 (9th Cir. 2019) (relying solely on the power to control and 
ignoring the other common law agency factors as inapplicable in finding an employment relationship). 
328. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 3.15(2) (AM. LAW INST. 2006). 
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contractors. The disintegration of industry threatened to shrink the reach of an in-
fluential doctrine and contract the liability boundaries of the firm. 
Third-party liability is now in the midst of a renaissance. By pushing today’s 
largest firms to police their counterparties, regulators have increased the chances 
that courts will see those firms as occupying a position of control. Furthermore, 
ubiquitous technologies of surveillance and platform exclusion make companies 
more vulnerable to charges of ubiquitous control. Regardless of courts’ approach 
to agency law, policymakers in many industries have bypassed the agency test to 
impose third-party liability through nondelegable duties. For this reason alone, it 
is no longer accurate to describe the state of the law as imposing liability only for 
the acts of independent contractors in unusual circumstances. 
Businesses would be expected to respond by bringing previously outsourced 
services in-house, more closely guarding their remaining counterparties, or lever-
aging technologies in ways that confuse courts as to the level of control. The 
potential growth and insulation of already large and dominant companies require 
attention. However, the revival, in the aggregate, is likely beneficial because a 
weak respondeat superior provides insufficient incentives for companies to take 
adequate precautions and absorb the full costs of their business affairs. 
Enhancing third-party liability is a rare legal reform that has the potential to 
improve both efficiency and equality—and to do so on a large scale. 
Thus, judges, regulators, and lawmakers should not hesitate to use the tools 
they each already have to reinforce the current patchwork of principles. Given 
courts’ historical receptivity to expanding vicarious liability for large companies, 
and the pervasive use by federal statutes of the common law test for control, a 
widespread judicial increase in respondeat gatekeeper is within reach without 
new legislation. Either way, the centuries-old measure of power is outdated and 
applied inconsistently. The third-party liability analysis would benefit from mod-
ern metrics of control and remedies that cause firms to internalize the costs of 
their activities. 
The core doctrinal and policy question is what firm sits at the nexus of power 
such that it could cost-effectively monitor and punish wrongdoing in its web of 
business associations. This emerging worldview amounts to network keeper 
liability, in which actors are responsible in proportion to their influence over a 
sphere of activities. Even in its current form, it has already begun to adapt third- 
party liability so that in a fragmented world, the superiors answer again.  
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